Introduction

As the world continues to shrink and become more transparent due to technological achievements in transportation and communication, people of different cultures and sensibilities are being thrust into each other’s lifeworlds whether we like it or not and, to invoke journalist William Greider’s phrase, whether we are “ready or not.”¹ This in a very real sense represents a crisis. The world’s peoples will no longer be able to take easy refuge from otherness, from alien ideas that disrupt, or threaten to disrupt, traditional norms, relationships and personal identities.

Clearly, this “globalization” requires changes in our cultural, political and moral imaginations, that is if the crisis will not lead to new catastrophic responses designed to reset the clock to the status quo ante – to before the pace of cultural inter-penetration was quickened by technologies brought on-line in the last few decades of the twentieth century. This essay will address such imaginations, i.e. (1) how we reassess or reappraise the value of cultures (our own as well as those of others); (2) how we re-conceive the scope of our political activities and concerns; and (3) how we engage one another as moral agents, as the bearers of dignity and as the creators of lifeworlds that must be given due respect.

Globalization is a word that bids us to consider our own relationships to other human beings who live both

---


proximally and distally. It is almost natural, therefore, to think of political universalists who have argued for a political imagination that, indeed, includes an emphasis on and revalorization of distal peoples and their lifeworlds, respectively. Among the earliest of these were the ancient Greek Stoics, who gave us the notion of the cosmopolite (Kosmopolite) or “citizen of the world.” Stoic cosmopolitan thought is sketchy, however, whether in Zeno’s Republic,\(^3\) in Epictetus’s Discourses, or in other Stoic writings. Yet Stoic thought provides a good philosophical foundation, some believe, for the machinery of a functional cosmopolitan order. The philosopher Martha Nussbaum argues forcefully that the stoic morality that bids us to move away from particularism, provincialism, jingoism and chauvinism connect nicely with deontological principles in morality that insist upon the supreme value of the individual human being, since it is the individual who is the bearer of dignity. Nussbaum’s moral shift of emphasis from the communitarian to the cosmopolitan is problematic, however, insofar as it takes the form of another moral theory that seems to do injustice to the richness of communal bonds, local attachments, and the actual products of human cultures. While I assent to Nussbaum’s vision of a cosmopolitan order, I take issue with some of the conclusions of her moral philosophy and with her largely underdeveloped political vision. While I share her vision, I believe that its actualization will require an articulation of methods and strategies as well as a more comprehensive treatment of the communal and personal sensibilities that remain impediments to that vision.

This essay is an attempt to sketch a thicker cosmopolitanism than either the Stoics or Nussbaum provide. In order to do this it is necessary to address each of culture, politics and ethics, since to leave any of these three spheres of life unaddressed would lead only to a partial thickening of the cosmopolitan visions referenced. §§ II & III of this essay draw into the discussion certain real political and empirical considerations in order to lift cosmopolitanism from the velleity that many communitarians believe it is. These deal with actual political institutions and organizations that can be seen to, at least arguably, provide incarnations for moral and political cosmopolitans to work with and through. Each of these institutions and organizations have defects, but I think that a fair assessment of each of them – particularly large ones like the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions – will demonstrate melioration and reform that is in no small part due to pressure from peoples, and not merely

---

states and organizational constituents. Nevertheless, in no way will I be attempting in these sections to provide an in-depth analysis of global institutions that are playing a part in effecting elements of the cosmopolitan vision, such as in the areas of human rights and development. On the other hand, how does one attempt to sketch a tenable cosmopolitanism without at least some reference to such institutions?

In §§ I and II I deal with the cosmopolitan/communitarian split, and the defects I find in the Nussbaum formulation and with the very notion of “citizens of the world.” I do so with reference to some of her own critics, and through an analysis of the idea of citizenship itself. This analysis concludes with a rethinking of what citizenship of the world might actually consist in – what I call a confraternity and which ties §§ I and II together. The notion of confraternity is discussed in § III.

§ IV is concerned exclusively with ethics. In particular, I address my own concern regarding the moral readiness for a cosmopolitan society, i.e. one that possesses a certain political imagination that is able to include the “other” in its circle of commitment and loyalty, that the cultural and existential crisis of globalization will be met best if the citizens of states or other sovereign compacts cultivate a moral character constitutive of virtues that allow them to embrace diversity and change without seeking refuge in a status quo ante that will ultimately cut them off and estrange them from their global neighbors. I argue that the incubator for sensibilities that have attempted to negotiate diversity and change is the modern liberal state. It is for that reason that I seek the citizens of such states to take the further steps that will lead beyond mere tolerance of diversity and change, but embrace them. Again, the communitarian critique of cosmopolitanism in part entails the belief that such an imagination is virtually impossible to sustain. It is therefore necessary to address why, on moral grounds, these communitarians seem mistaken. Without addressing the normative ethics of cosmopolites it is impossible to construct a plan to educate citizens, and especially children toward lives of confraternal concerns for distal peoples. To a large degree, cosmopolitanism is concerned with moral education if it is concerned with anything at all. To fail to provide an outline of a cosmopolitan ethics is to leave its critics largely unanswered, since they (communitarians of various types) believe that morality is in fact rooted in the local, and with largely local application.
§ I. Cosmopolitans and Communitarians

THE COSMOPOLITAN INDIVIDUAL (or “cosmopolite”) has often been assailed by philosophers and non-philosophers alike, at least since the days of the Greek Stoics. From the fourth century B.C., Stoics, who often wrote and spoke about the virtues of expanding the circle that contains those perceived as “one of us,” swam against provincial currents that shaped most persons’– Greek and Roman – cultural identities. Greek and Roman particularism and chauvinism were common, as exemplified in philological texts. As is not unusual among advanced and well established civilizations even into more contemporary times (take the Chinese Mandate of Heaven, the status of the Japanese “race” and emperor in pre-World War II Shinto thought, and the German Arianism of National Socialism), the earlier Greeks held a notion that it was by divine ordination that humanity had been divided into Greeks and “barbarians,” higher and lower civilizations. However, Stoics of the fourth and third centuries B.C. argued against the idea of “racial” or cultural preeminence. The Stoics argued that all of human kind share one divine logos. This idea underpinned a metaphysics that translated into both an ethics and a politics and gave rise to the idea that all human beings are or should be seen as “citizens of the whole world,” to quote the later Stoic, Epictetus. These were the views of Seneca the Younger and Marcus Aurelius, who attempted to actualize these ideas by demonstrating acts of charity toward even

---

4 Patrick J. Deneen (Professor of Political Science at Princeton) attempts to point out the nature of this particularism and the inconceivability, as expressed in the Homeric epics, of the particular-transcendent notions of the cosmopolitan world view expressed by Diogenes the Cynic. See his “Against Cosmopolitanism: Resisting the Siren’s Song” in The Odyssey of Political Theory: The Politics of Departure and Return (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000)

5 Non-Greeks were called barbaroi by the Greeks, or “barbarians”. The word barbaros refers to the speech of infants or babes, referring to stutters and verbal sounds such as “bah-bah” (=“barbar”). A non-Greek’s language supposedly reminded Greeks of such verbal sounds, which made for amusement at the foreigner’s expense. Barbaros, or “stutterer” thus became a pejorative for the “foreigner.” The word’s meaning can be traced traced in Homer’s Iliad 2,867; Herodotus’s History 2,158; Aeschylus’s Agamemnon 2013; Plato’s Protagoras 341C; and Strabo’s Geography 14,28. See Women Priests Catholic Internet Library, www.womenpriests.org/traditio/bias_gen.htm

6 “If mind is common to us all, then also reason, whereby we are reasoning beings, is common. If this be so, then also the reasons which enjoins what is to be done or left undone is common. If this be so, law also is common; if this be so, we are citizens; if this be so, we are partakers in one constitution; if this be so, the Universe is a kind of Commonwealth. For in what other common government can we say that the whole race of men partakes? And thence, from this common City, is derived our mind itself, our reason and our sense of law, or from what else?” Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IV:4.
“barbarians” and slaves. Later, Epictetus would argue the same political sentiments, but using earlier philosophers (Socrates and Diogenes the Cynic) to explicate these principles, which are contained in his Discourses. But these views bucked the chauvinism of Greek and Roman self-regard and were viewed with suspicion by fellow citizens.

Today, in a post-modern age which is particularly critical of claims of universality, the seriousness with which the cosmopolite’s views are taken may be on about the same level as kitsch is taken in the art world. This is largely because the notion of the cosmopolite, who has at least three iterations, i.e. cultural, moral and political, often get reduced to a vulgar version of the cultural iteration, whereby the idea of cultural openness becomes a kind of cultural play. This sense is captured by a review of the various ways in which the word “cosmopolitan” is used, as can be determined by a casual search of the internet. One such search captured a posting from a marriage broker’s web site that read: “This 35 year old Hispanic male describes himself as suave, cosmopolitan, and confident. An up and coming telecom executive he travels extensively through the Southwestern states for a major fortune 500 company.” With this vulgar conception of the cosmopolite as engaged in cultural play comes her image in the popular media to suggest a certain kind of superficial political, cultural or even sexual “sophistication” – even gleeful, self-congratulating deviance. For mass media and commercial purposes, the cosmopolite is portrayed as one who is an adventurer into alien territories, who has seen more and done more, possessing a greater toleration for difference than her compatriots. She is portrayed, in media images as comfortable far removed from provincial mores and lifestyles. She is the jet-setter, the globe trotter. With this skewing toward a vulgar cultural play as the defining feature of the cosmopolite,

7 “If the things are true which are said by the philosophers about the kinship between God and man, what else remains for men to do than what Socrates did? Never in reply to the question, to what country you belong, say that you are an Athenian or a Corinthian, but that you are a citizen of the world. For why do you say that you are an Athenian, and why do you not say that you belong to the small nook only into which your poor body was cast at birth? Is it not plain that you call yourself an Athenian or Corinthian from the place which has a greater authority and comprises not only that small nook itself and all your family, but even the whole country from which the stock of your progenitors is derived down to you? He then who has observed with intelligence the administration of the world, and has learned that the greatest and supreme and the most comprehensive community is that which is composed of men and God, and that from God have descended the seeds not only to my father and grandfather, but to all beings which are generated on the earth and are produced, and particularly to rational beings- for these only are by their nature formed to have communion with God, being by means of reason conjoined with Him- why should not such a man call himself a citizen of the world, why not a son of God, and why should he be afraid of anything which happens among men? Is kinship with Caesar or with any other of the powerful in Rome sufficient to enable us to live in safety, and above contempt and without any fear at all? and to have God for your maker and father and guardian, shall not this release us from sorrows and fears?” Epictetus, The Discourses, Bk. I, 9
“cosmopolitan” is a word that has come to connote, at least for some, the bridging of commercial, artistic and sexual differences, as well as detachment and distance from (or even abnegation of or hostility toward) one’s national or local communities as places where it is impossible to have a full and useful life. For these persons, the cosmopolite is a wayfarer, filled with wanderlust and a need for the new for its own sake. This is often the view put forward by critics of both moral and political cosmopolites (i.e., those who argue a duty to fashion political and moral thought that encompasses distal communities) to undercut their credibility. Such critics are often effective because the labeling of the cosmopolite as one engaged in games is often hitched to the sometimes problematic moral and political arguments put forth by some cosmopolites themselves – arguments based more on moral sentiment than a program that pays proper respect to the particular cultural commitments of peoples; arguments that seem to bid us to choose (unnecessarily) between the particular and the universal in selecting our ultimate moral attachments.

For the cosmopolite to emerge from this realm of superficiality, from the depths of cultural kitsch wherein she is not taken seriously and is therefore safe as far as her “compatriots” are concerned, is to emerge from the level of harmless intellectual vagabond to the level of infidel—particularly if there are reactionary political conditions brewing but not only under these circumstances. For if she is to be taken seriously she would have to meet a new kind of challenge, namely as representing an inimical or at least potentially inimical posture toward the political and cultural community of which she is explicitly and legally a part by virtue of domicile or citizenship. She would face the imputation of an attitude, whether she holds it or not. She would be accused of elitism and disloyalty, of scorning the very beliefs that the community holds dear. She would be viewed with suspicion when it comes to considerations of questions that are held to be important or crucial to the communities that continue to valorize the very traditions or “given” inputs in ways that cosmopolites, supposedly, do not.

Many contemporary philosophers and intellectuals, as well, display a certain degree of suspicion of or contempt for cosmopolites. In an unpublished essay by philosopher Jorge Garcia of Rutgers University (Racial and Ethnic Identity: Some Conceptual Problems), Garcia winds down his analysis of the coherence of the concept of identity by attempting to assure that he will not be labeled as a cosmopolite, although sounding quite like one. I quote at length to give context to this distancing:
In a deflationary account [of race or ethnicity], ethnoracial special ties of pride, loyalty, fellow-feeling, solidarity, etc. are at best regarded and realized as normally morally neutral (neither obligatory nor preferable); as without major significance; as impermanent; as light-hearted and low-key; as tolerant, appreciative, and uncritical, not only with respect to others’ ethnic affiliations but also to other responses/attitudes that people (within or without one’s own group) do or might have to their ethnicity; as matters to be treated not very seriously (i.e., as largely inconsequential) in their positive role . . . but with constant and grave awareness of their potential for mischief; as external to the moral self rather than constitutive of it; as not at all determinative of moral, political, or religious commitments, but of only minor and indirect relevance to them . . . ; as shallow in both the self-image (what seems to be what is often mis-characterized as someone’s ‘identity’) of a sober-thinking person and in her view of others . . . . The core of anyone’s self image (and other image) should be the core of the self. That includes, first, those features of the self that do not vary across times and across possible situations (as ethnicity and race may, and are especially prone to do if, as is so commonly said nowadays, they are “socially constructed”). Second, it comprises those which have the greatest impact on moral virtues, duties, etc. Such self-images may allow us to achieve internal coherence of self without ethnic or racial purity.

Garcia then goes on to say:

This is not to endorse some fashionable cosmopolitanism. Among the problems in cosmopolitanism, and in the “irony” that attends it in [Anthony] Appiah, [Richard] Rorty, et al., are that the cosmos, the world, is made to do the work of a community in giving people a sense of belonging and of joint striving, as something it is simply too large to do, unless we adopt certain special cosmological assumption. We will need smaller or, at least, more unified groupings. However, ethnicities, especially in this age of diaspora, are ill suited to fill this role. . . . What we need, perhaps, is a
new interpersonalist personalism, stressing self-(and other-) images that emphasizes the status of someone as a human being, as a rational animal, or even as a creature of God, etc., with a past, an inherent nature, existing always with other persons in relationships of dependence and concern, which relationships are also normatively significant vocations, containing the clues from which someone can come to understand who she is and what suits/behoves/becomes fits such a one.

This belief that belonging and joint striving is the possession only of the local, and/or is antithetical to the cosmopolitan morality and politics for which I will argue in favor herein is based on some false assumptions, the first of which are that cosmopolitanism is some kind of effete moral and political project. I agree that what we need is a new “interpersonalist personalism” but what Garcia calls for is precisely the “fashionable cosmopolitanism” he attempts to avoid.

Others, such as Stanley Fish, take on cosmopolitanism and cosmopolites (though not necessarily using these labels) with more directness. In his book, *The Trouble with Principle*, Fish challenges the “fuzziness” of certain antifoundationalist ideas:

But in whatever form it takes, the project is an instance of what I call the critical self-consciousness fallacy or antifoundationalist theory hope, the fallacy of thinking that there is a mental space you can occupy to the side of your convictions and commitments, and the hope that you can use the lesson that no transcendent standpoint is available as a way of bootstrapping yourself to transcendence (on the reasoning that since we now know that “we cannot hope to escape from’ our prejudices, we can be on guard against those prejudices and better able to see things clearly). . . . Both pragmatist philosophy and democratic process begin in a recognition of the intractability of difference, and it would be a contradiction to turn that recognition into a method for eliminating (or even ameliorating) difference. Democracy (*pace* [Richard] Bernstein) is not a program for transforming men and women into capacious and generous beings but is a device for managing the narrow
partialities that (as Hobbes saw so clearly) will always inform the activities of human actors.\textsuperscript{8}

This is a very rough sketch not only of the ways cosmopolites are often viewed by those engaged in “serious” political and cultural issues, but it is also the beginning of a sketch of the philosophical and cultural lines drawn between cosmopolites and communitarians, the latter seeing traditional inputs and imperatives as crucial to not only the survival of community as such, be it nation-state or village or virtual or spiritual communities (as in the case, for example, of Jews or diaspora Africans), but also to the flourishing of those communities. We will take-up the communitarian critique of cosmopolitanism in § IV. In this gloss I have, using Fish, but articulated the beginnings of a caricature of the communitarian position, just as I have painted only one of several caricatures of the cosmopolitan, a caricature that, unfortunately, continues to have currency. This currency is often perpetuated by communitarians and cosmopolitans themselves. For in reality neither side is wholly devoid of the qualities of the other but are stuck with unhelpful language such as “transcendence of the particular” and “universalism” and “community to which we owe the highest moral loyalty.” Communitarian thought, as stated, places high value on the creation of and solidification of accepted values, beliefs and practices which were derived to a great degree in response to influences from the “outside,” although this fact is too often forgotten. Likewise, serious cosmopolitan thought (such as that which I will argue for in these pages) carries with it a necessary respect for communities of different kinds because it is through the dynamic of communities (what I will call social sociability in contrast to Kant’s “unsocial sociability,” which prizes a kind of self-conceit in human competition) that new insights, new ways of living and new beginnings are most fruitfully generated, explored and guaranteed. The either/or nature of the debate between cosmopolites and communitarians seems to gloss or miss this point, and the rhetoric of either side is constructed around the goal of refuting the other by painting the other in cartoonish outlines. Communitarians become reactionary Hobbesians all, and cosmopolites become political dreamers.

IN THIS ESSAY, what I will attempt to do is analyze both the lexicon and assumptions that frequently turn-up

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{FLC}, 305-306
There are numerous anthologies, recently published, dealing with the debate between cosmopolites and their critics, as noted in the bibliography. See Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Rorty denies any “foundationalist” conditions for solidarity. I am almost in complete agreement with his nominalistic approach to politics and morality, but when trying to follow him to complete hyper-nominalism I bump-up against Dewey, who reminds us that the “requirements of continued existence make indispensable some attention to the actual facts of the world. Although it is surprising how little check the environment actually puts upon the formation of ideas, since no notions are too absurd not to have been accepted by some people, yet the environment does enforce a certain minimum of correctness under penalty of extinction. That certain things are foods, that they are to be found in certain places, that water drowns, fire burns, that sharp points penetrate and cut, that heavy things fall unless supported, that there is a certain regularity in the changes of day and night and the alternation of hot and cold, wet and dry: – such prosaic facts force themselves upon even primitive attention.” (*Reconstruction in Philosophy*). I part company with Rorty when he departs with Dewey, and tells us that “water drowns” is not a fact of the matter about the world. He is right that these facts of the matter cannot tell us a good deal about what we who to do and who we ought to be, but they do provide quite sturdy guardrails. Culture does not literally end where fire burns and water drowns (human sacrifice has employed both) but it is hard to forge sustainable cultural practices that require these as constants, as they extinguish life itself. So the basis for determining what “cruelty” consists in (the major concern of Rorty’s liberal ironist) is not merely the reading of novels, but nature itself. Novels did not create nature, but nature novels.

---

9 There are numerous anthologies, recently published, dealing with the debate between cosmopolites and their critics, as noted in the bibliography.

10 See Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Rorty denies any “foundationalist” conditions for solidarity. I am almost in complete agreement with his nominalistic approach to politics and morality, but when trying to follow him to complete hyper-nominalism I bump-up against Dewey, who reminds us that the “requirements of continued existence make indispensable some attention to the actual facts of the world. Although it is surprising how little check the environment actually puts upon the formation of ideas, since no notions are too absurd not to have been accepted by some people, yet the environment does enforce a certain minimum of correctness under penalty of extinction. That certain things are foods, that they are to be found in certain places, that water drowns, fire burns, that sharp points penetrate and cut, that heavy things fall unless supported, that there is a certain regularity in the changes of day and night and the alternation of hot and cold, wet and dry: – such prosaic facts force themselves upon even primitive attention.” (*Reconstruction in Philosophy*). I part company with Rorty when he departs with Dewey, and tells us that “water drowns” is not a fact of the matter about the world. He is right that these facts of the matter cannot tell us a good deal about what we who to do and who we ought to be, but they do provide quite sturdy guardrails. Culture does not literally end where fire burns and water drowns (human sacrifice has employed both) but it is hard to forge sustainable cultural practices that require these as constants, as they extinguish life itself. So the basis for determining what “cruelty” consists in (the major concern of Rorty’s liberal ironist) is not merely the reading of novels, but nature itself. Novels did not create nature, but nature novels.
In modern times, the communitarian/cosmopolitan debate has been coextensive with the humanism/postmodernism debate, the Enlightenment/irrationalist debate, and the realism/anti-realism debate. Since Lyotard’s *The Postmodern Condition* there has been a great deal of critique within the academy concerning the troublesome nature of so-called meta-narratives and universalist prescriptions for political and moral life. The axiological pendulum has swung so far in the direction of and in favor of the local and the small (political community or community of meaning vs. the idea of humanity and universal moral imperatives) that the central and the grand are frequently painted with a broad brush as simply “hegemonic,” an over-used word popularized in some Marxian circles and having come to describe any person or institution that is able to get his/its way in the world, an outcome which could only become extant for anybody if a zero sum game was fought and lost by some politically powerless, and therefore (according to the reasoning of the decriers of hegemony), morally superior individual who got the zero end of the stick.11 I invoke Lyotard, but I am aware that the roots of the attack on meta-narratives extend back to and beyond Nietzsche and Hegel and, as well, extend outward to and beyond many other thinkers, such as Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault and many representatives of the Frankfurt School. Further, critics of foundationalism such as Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida must also be mentioned, although among all these thinkers there are serious disagreements about what the “demise” or meta-narratives and foundationalism should mean in practice. Unfortunately, in some of the discussions regarding meta-narratives and antifoundationalism as much heat as light is generated, not necessarily only on the part of the major critics of meta-narratives and foundationalism, but on the part of those who take-up their critiques and use them to assail the various organs of government and of the systems that congeal into what is often referred to, with marked derision, as “global capitalism” – the catch phrase for, *inter alia,* culturally interpenetrating and powerful economic interests. (Like “hegemony,” “global capitalism” is often used as a pejorative, not merely as a descriptive.)

---

11 According to Richard Bellamy, “. . . the concept of hegemony or *gegemoniva* had a long history in the Russian labour movement going back to the writings of Plekhanov. Within this tradition it had been used to refer to the need to form a revolutionary awareness and political will amongst the proletariat that went beyond their narrow corporate interests, but it did not have the additional meaning Gramsci gave it to describe the mechanisms of ideological consensus within a developed political system. Lenin had adopted the term for the Russian Social-Democrats and it was employed in the external documents of the Third Communist International, from which source Gramsci almost certainly picked it up. However, the term also has an Italian lineage in the writings of the nineteenth-century philosopher Vincenzo Gioberti, who used it in an analogous manner to signify the ‘moral primacy’ one province within a national grouping might exert over others.” (*Gramsci: Pre-Prison Writings*, Richard Bellamy (ed.), pg. xxvii). Of course, now the term has simply come to describe the dominant player in almost any disproportionate power relation.
Perhaps we can turn down the heat and turn up the light by a consideration of the terms and notions frequently employed in the debate between cosmopolites and communitarians by reconsidering whether meta-narratives are always as bad as some have made them out to be; whether the idea of a grand narrative of humanity, retrofitted to prescind the sloppy romanticisms of the past and the present, might serve to help create a safer and more collaborative social order that includes, while respecting, those who are members of far flung and distant cultures.

Let me be clear about the intent of this essay. First and foremost I intend to defend cosmopolitanism as a coherent and tenable set of ideas, virtues and principles to be referenced when deliberating about moral, political and cultural imperatives, and in deliberating about courses of action as regard the ordering and objectives of social institutions and the behaviors of those institutions. My view of cosmopolitan principles is that they perform cultural, moral, and political functions and do not constitute an ideology and need not necessarily displace the loyalty to particular ethnic groups or political unions, or require a reduction of fraternity to such particular ethnic groups or political unions. (However that loyalty must become a critical loyalty and that fraternity, a critical fraternity, i.e. the loyalty and fraternity are not to demand absolute allegiance.)

Further, I reject the view that the cosmopolite is attempting to “boot strap” herself into a transcendent perspective of her own contextual community and those of others, as Fish suggests, and I reject any form of cosmopolitanism that stops with sentimental expressions surrounding a “common humanity.” Rather, what I argue for are shifts in cultural, moral and political imagination that are much simpler, although not easy to accomplish. These shifts can be summed up in three words – sympathy, contingency and humility. In my view, it is sympathy that remains at the foundation of most ethical theories. The ability to see other human beings as rational animals, or as homo faber, or as the being capable of Sorge first presupposes our understanding that each of the qualities represented thereby (thinking, making, caring) we ourselves possess, and the possession of each constitutes a human nature that hyper-nominalistic forms of anti-foundationalism, such as Richard Rorty’s, would deny. In our sympathy for even distal peoples we come to understand the contingent nature of their cultures and their political and moral schemes, and can better understand the possibility that we ourselves may have gone down similar paths given similar background conditions.
Finally, it is the realization, through sympathy and by the affirmation of the contingent natures of all cultural background conditions, that we come to avoid hypostasizing our own moral, cultural and political choices. The objective of these cosmopolitan principles, distilled in sympathy, contingency and humility is to further the possibility of peaceful coexistence, not mere tolerance, between peoples. I do not intend to defend the caricature of the cosmopolite described above, for I find incoherent the application of the term to persons who are merely interested in a set of personal aesthetic experiences rather than political or moral progress (increasing our sympathy for other peoples, the awareness of the contingency of all cultures and increasing our humility in the face of other peoples’ preference and practices), at least to the extent that the word’s etymology seems misapplied to such persons. (As well, the serious political concerns of the stoics themselves preclude such an application.) For while I will critique the very idea of “world citizen” in what follows, I do so because the very idea of citizenship has serious moral and political content.

Recognizing the contingent natures of all cultural commitments is very difficult for many. Many view their communities and cultures as relatively static. The cosmopolite, on the other hand, is a cultural deflationist. A cultural deflationist is roughly the same as what Richard Rorty calls an “ironist” — one who is more or less comfortable embracing the idea that one’s own “final vocabulary” (politics, metaphysics, cultural beliefs) is and should always be subject to possible revision or rejection. Unlike Rorty, who holds that ironism cannot be the sort of philosophical attitude that we teach citizens to inculcate as a regulator of their own commitments, I hold that ironism/deflationism contains critical ethical principles that should be widely sowed and cultivated, principles that prime the pumps of human social intercourse, dialogue and democratic participation by lessening the self-certainty (i.e., lack of humility) that forestalls compromise and the ability to respectfully acknowledge the nature of others’ loyalties to their own final vocabularies. Ironism/deflationism rests upon fallibilism, which the cosmopolitan takes to be the hallmark of emotionally, philosophically, psychologically and politically mature peoples.

“Interexistence” as Imagination and Practice

A tenable cosmopolitanism needn’t make grand theoretical claims, or paint a comprehensive vision about what a cosmopolitan order might look like. Cosmopolitan thought needn’t be seen as an alternative system of
political or moral thought. It does, however, need to proffer a set of useful principles that, if integrated into the cultural, political and moral deliberative practices of disparate peoples (and their various institutions) can serve to help assure a certain salutary objective, namely mutual reliance upon and peaceful coexistence and cultural intercourse between neighbors and nations or nation-states. That objective I wish to call “interexistence.”

Interexistence may be understood as the razing of what has become a highly problematic point of view in a shrinking world, i.e. that one’s own self or one’s own community is or ought to be the sole center of the material, spiritual, emotional and intellectual resources for life. It replaces the idea that one or one’s culture exists in relative isolation with the idea that one and one’s culture “inter-exists.” It pushes aside the idea that a full life consists solely in the local life (even where local is national), that one’s font of material and emotional resources for negotiating life are sufficiently derived from extant local traditions, practices and people. Interexistence is the embrace of the logic of seeking out the resources for one’s and one’s community’s life from as many “sources” as practicable. If this sounds like a grand contextualism, that is because it is. the idea of interexistence is intended to rethink the very meaning of context as used in so much post-modern analysis.

The political and moral upside of interexistence, in addition to the personal one, is that nearly all cultures and peoples may be held as valuable to the growth of one’s own community and one’s self, if not now then eventually. It is a life that clothes the naked platitude that “we all need each other” and is active in searching out from others those things, habits and practices that we have concluded might be of use. By viewing distal peoples, along with proximate peoples, compatriots, as “ready reserves” of the “resources” we need to live good lives, we come to value them as exemplars of possibilities that we have not yet imagined or seriously considered. As will be seen in the examples, below, there is nothing at all grand or abstract about either the imagination or the practice of interexistence. The impediments to the interexistent sensibility and attendant practices are those “vices” and habits of mind that cosmopolitan ethics seek to overcome, as discussed in § 4. That is, the impediments to interexistence are largely ethical ones.

Genuine interexistence cannot come about through any form of aggression or coercion. Rather, it can come about only through an active “quest” for “better” ways to meet actual local or personal problems and to assist oneself or one’s community to thrive according to its own telos. Interexistence is the active consideration of
other cultural practices or the holding of those practices in active reserve, and so valuing them as potential features of one’s own lifeworld. Some examples might be helpful. Here are a few that are, or seem, quite different from one another in character.

In recognition of the flagging quality of some American products in the 1970s and 1980s, and the relatively high quality and therefore market success of Japanese manufacturers of durable goods, American business schools and managers started to study Japanese techniques. It was in seeking, of their own accord, to better understand Japanese management techniques that the U.S. automotive industry, to name just one industry, regained its reputation for quality through the 1980s and 1990s. The recognition that the creation of quality products is not the monopoly of one culture, however large and successful, led to improvements in American finished goods, improvements that are still being enjoyed today.

Clearly, there is nothing grand or philosophical about this first example, and that is precisely the point. It is an example from an ordinary activity of human culture (business) that demonstrates the advantage of laying aside one’s chauvinism and biases, and of embracing a humility that allowed the seeking of resources from outside of the local cultural font, yielding salutary results. But there are examples from other areas of culture as well, examples of a less impersonal and more emotionally charged nature.

Currently, there are several politically charged debates that are raging in the United States – concerning abortion, capital punishment and euthanasia. Parochial responses to the issues raised in these debates limit the conceptual schemes in which the issues are or may be considered. Discourse is, therefore, truncated since the full range of considerations is barred. A serious attempt to gain insight from how others view what we take to be the exigencies of each of these issues can only be useful in establishing fresh perspectives.

For example, many Americans might ask themselves, for example, how the French could develop, manufacture and globally mass market RU-486 (the abortion pill that works by blocking progesterone necessary to sustain a pregnancy) when they deem it fundamentally immoral? Are the French immoralists? What kinds of background information regarding the French (and the many European women who use RU-486) might be helpful for Americans to consider in the debate? How can Americans understand the European acceptance of
RU-486, given that Europeans have the same Judeo-Christian roots as Americans? The question of how something is categorically forestalled in one culture and freely permissible in another is a line of inquiry that the interexistent cosmopolitan is always ready to explore.

On the subject of capital punishment, all Western European countries condemn the American practice as barbaric. An understanding of the background assumptions of Western European countries will only serve to cast the American practice in a different light. The same applies in the euthanasia debate. The Dutch senate’s recent decision approving euthanasia and making the Netherlands the first country in the world to allow so-called “mercy killing” has shocked many Americans. How do the Dutch understand that shock? How can Americans understand the Dutch decision procedure that led them to passing such a law?

An intraexistant as apposed to interexistant conception of and approach to each of these issues – management techniques, RU-486, capital punishment, and euthanasia – only truncates the consideration of alternatives on the grounds that potential interexistent interlocutors, not being “one of us,” have nothing to say of relevance to our own adjudication of these issues. Interexistence, on the other hand, is an intellectual disposition that places one in the nexus of all cultural practices, however remote some of those practices, although the interexistent is not so deluded as to believe that all such practices are equally relevant to his or her own experiences, or are equally useful or desirable (some may not be desirable at all). Nevertheless, viewing oneself as a member of a vast cultural nexus, one has access to them all for one’s own purposes, and the interexistent does not see any cultural manifestation as “owned” by any community or people. So too, each community is, a fortiori, within the nexus as well. Talk, then, of the way “they” do things versus the way “we” do things is given a different character. The interexistent re-conceives cultures as iterations of practices that are of a kind with or bear a family resemblance to his own, rather than as rigid types. The interexistent sensibility, as an active engagement with otherness in a vast cultural nexus, is a critical component of moral and political cosmopolitanism. The willingness to grasp otherness and engage it is the way that interexistent cosmopolitans construct their lifeworlds.

Peoples and individuals can choose to remain intraexistant, parochial, i.e. not actively seeking resources from elsewhere on the cultural nexus. Their decision procedures concerning the approach to problems or issues that
confront them may remain insular. Of course, there is no foundationalist argument as to why they should not, but by considering the advantages of an interexistent sensibility, the benefits of active engagement, the softening of the boundaries that surround them, they may choose to adopt the benefits that attend this way of thinking. They may also choose the opposite.

§ II. Martha Nussbaum’s “Citizen of the World”

In order to begin to flesh out my notion of cosmopolitanism, I will start with an exploration of the idea of “citizen,” insofar as the word “cosmopolitan” is usually translated as “citizen of the world/cosmos” (from the Greek, kosmopolite). We will, I believe, see from this examination that much of the critique of cosmopolitan thought can be effectively answered if the notion of citizen is recast by first deconstructing it. Thus, we will see that to speak of a citizen of the world has a character quite distinct from the idea of citizen of a state, for example. Only by making this distinction can cosmopolitanism be seen to consist in a set of defensible moral and political ideas. Most importantly, we will see that “world citizenship” is a moral concept, but a moral concept that has political implications, i.e. implications as to what become acceptable and relevant inputs concerning the dispensing of the resources of local political and economic communities, and the claims those communities have on individuals. As I will show, modern cosmopolites are not without concrete political expressions through which to work, and it is in these concrete political expressions that their “world citizenship” can be conceived.

In discussing the ideas of citizenship and afterward I will turn to Martha Nussbaum’s For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism (hereafter, “FLC”), a text in which Nussbaum, as a champion of cosmopolitanism, is met with a series of challenges by an array of thinkers including Sissela Bok, Robert Pinsky, Michael Walzer and several others. First, I will explicate Nussbaum’s position in the opening essay of FLC, but rather than praising it I will attempt to show just where the major weaknesses in that opening essay

are and how they can and should be avoided if a serious moral and political cosmopolitanism is to be proffered and effectively defended. (This is not to say that Nussbaum makes no effective arguments.) I will explore Nussbaum’s views in that opening essay by occupying some of the positions of her critics. I will discuss the political tenability of cosmopolitanism by way of a critique of the notion of citizenship. I will then turn to Nussbaum’s rejoinder essay where I believe she effectively deals with some of the criticisms of her cosmopolitan position, particularly that she is merely a sentimentalist, for in rehabilitating her arguments it will become clear that some of her critics have not properly thought through their own criticisms of cosmopolitanism. Last, I will proffer the need for the development of a virtue ethics to address the obstacles to cosmopolitanism at the level of individual actors. I will argue for the need to rethink the virtues in the context of fabricating a truly cosmopolitan democracy, virtues that will lead us away from “tribalistic” and particularistic preferences and toward a greater acceptance of cultural and identity instability, since I believe the vision of a cosmopolitan democratic global order will rise or fall at the level of individual moral actors.

In FLC, Martha Nussbaum criticizes two political stances that she believes are morally problematic to her vision of a Kantianesque cosmopolitan order. Those two stances are patriotism and the “politics of difference.” She sees both as two sides of the same coin – “One might wonder, however, how far the politics of nationalism really is from the politics of difference” (Pg. 5). Beyond this assertion, Nussbaum, as a classicist, looks back for exemplars of a cosmopolitan ethos. I give you several such examples which recur, in different permutations, in her writings in and beyond FLC:

When Diogenes the Cynic replied, “I am a citizen of the world,” he meant, apparently, that he refused to be defined by his local origins and group memberships, so central to the self-image of the conventional Greek male; instead he defined himself in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns. The Stoics, who followed his lead, further developed his image of the kosmou politês (world citizen) arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities—the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration that is truly great and truly common, in which

---

13 My qualifier “Kantianesque” refers, principally, to the arguments Kant himself made in his famous essay *Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View*. As well, Kant’s cosmopolitanism is tied to a series of other arguments made in both *Perpetual Peace* and his essay *What is Enlightenment*?
we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun”
(Seneca, De Otio).

Quoting Plutarch’s The Fortunes of Alexander:

We should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors.

And, giving us more elaboration on the view of the Stoics of the first and second centuries CE, she tells us that:

The Stoics stress that to be a citizen of the world one does not need to give up local identifications, which can be a source of great richness in life. They suggest that we think of ourselves not as devoid of local affiliations, but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles. The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family, then, in order, neighbors or local groups, fellow city-dwellers, and fellow countrymen – and we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender, or sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest one, humanity as a whole. Our task as citizens of the world will be to “draw the circles somehow toward the center” (Stoic philosopher Hierocles . . .), making all human beings more like our fellow city-dwellers, and so on. We need not give up our special affections and identifications, whether ethnic or gender-based or religious. We need not think of them as superficial, and we may think of our identity as constituted partly on them. We may and should devote special attention to them in education. But

---

14 FLC, pg. 6-7. In De Otio, Seneca bids us: “Let us grant the idea that there are two commonwealths – the one, a vast and truly common state, which embraces alike gods and men, in which we look neither to this corner of earth not to that, but measure the bounds of our citizenship by the path of the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned by the accident of birth. This will be the commonwealth of the Athenians or of the Carthaginians, or of any other city that belongs, not to all, but to some particular race of men. Some yield service to both commonwealths at the same time—to the greater and to the lesser—some only to the lesser, some only to the greater.” It is important to note here that Seneca is writing in favor of the need for leisure which allows us the opportunity to examine the questions and mysteries of life. Those questions require the examination of as diverse a spectrum of human potentials as is possible, and certainly those not available merely within our own “commonwealths” or polities. Leisure, therefore, while having political uses is aimed at the enrichment of the individual soul. Notice the phrasing, however, “Let us grant . . .” at the beginning of Seneca’s remarks, the expression that does not call for a literal belief in the existence of the “vast and truly common state” but to view all of mankind according to the metaphor of the “lesser” state.

15 FLC, pg. 7.
we should also work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, and give the circles that defines our humanity special attention and respect.  

I want to examine this notion of “citizen of the world” a little more closely, critiquing not only Nussbaum’s reception of this ancient idea, but also Kwame Anthony Appiah’s when he tells us, in a favorable response to Nussbaum’s opening essay in FLC, that “. . . the notion of a global citizenship can have a real and practical meaning.” I think that Appiah is correct, but neither he nor Nussbaum fills-out this claim. The idea of a citizen of the world becomes problematic at the outset of our consideration when judged against the backdrop of realpolitik. The genealogy of citizenship takes us back millennia, and probably beyond the Greek polis, although it is with and in reference to the polis that we find, in Aristotle’s Politics, the most thorough delineation of the concept of citizen. This does not mean that the idea of citizen was as inclusive as or carried all of the rights, protections and privileges that one attributes to citizenship in the our day, particularly in modern welfare states, but the general notion of reciprocal duties and rights was and remains critical to any understanding of citizenship. Service and loyalty to the sovereign in return for certain protections and rights is common to all types of citizenship. This is a sine qua non of any tenable formulation of citizenship. Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and Locke, for example, have political theories which reflect this sine qua non although with different notions of the role of the sovereign and the impetus to citizenship.

In addition to the “constitutional” sources of this reciprocal obligation, driven by a need to enjoy the obvious benefits of a political community existing pursuant to mutual agreement under some positive compact, there

---

16 FLC, pg. 9.

17 FLC, pg. 27.

18 Aristotle’s discussion of the obligations of the citizen, for example, as found in the Nicomachean Ethics and in the Politics (especially in Book III).


20 For example, Hobbes discusses in Leviathan that the impetus to civilized government was the short and brutish existence of human beings absent such government, while Locke argued that it was the need to protect property and to further personal freedom that lead to the creation of the commonwealth. Each held an account of the “state of nature” but the account differed substantially.
are also important emotional components of citizenship. First, the governing organs of the political community itself (say, the state) must carry a sensibility that allows them to treat all citizens as on par with each other and as collectively responsible for their own existence, just as citizens are to view themselves as equals. As Ronald Dworkin puts it,

No government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the fate of all those citizens over whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims allegiance. Equal concern is the sovereign virtue of political community . . . .

Dworkin’s notion of equality is modern, but the same words could be heard coming from Aristotle himself, even though entrance into Athenian citizenship was permitted with much more discrimination than the modern democrat would be able to abide. Dworkin’s remarks demonstrate the obligation of any non-tyrannical state to recognize, equally, the needs of those who are its subjects.

But there are other relational elements of citizenship (citizenship is a relation between those who are citizens and between those citizens and the sovereign) which are also emotional and which must not be overlooked, although in practice they frequently are not only overlooked but played-down except on occasions of political celebration or crisis. Rawls captures these emotional elements in A Theory of Justice, wherein, in the course of a delineation of his difference principle, he talks about the fraternal feeling that tends to exist between citizens. This sense of fraternity flows from that which is another crucial element of citizenship, i.e. equality between fellows who agree to be bound under the same political compact, and which grows in recognition of the mutual destiny that compact creates. Says Rawls,

In comparison with liberty and equality, the idea of fraternity has had a lesser place in democratic theory. It is thought to be less specifically a political concept, not in itself defining any of the democratic rights but conveying instead certain attitudes of mind and forms of conduct without which we would lose sight of the values expressed by these rights.[n] Or

---

21 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, Page 1
closely related to this, fraternity is held to represent a certain equality of social esteem manifest in various public conventions and in the absence of manners of deference and servility.\footnote{22}

Thus, on a liberal reading of Rawls, citizenship is represented not only by the creation of a positive political compact and not only in the fair execution of that compact, but it also entails an element not properly political but crucial nonetheless. This Rawls calls \textit{fraternity}, which must entail a sense of conjoined destiny and inter-communicability based upon shared assumptions of law and custom. This notion of a fraternity has powerful psychological implications regarding the creation of numerous cultural memes and practices. Indeed, the lack of it can threaten to undo the political compact itself, as we saw in this country during the civil war and during the struggle for civil rights by African Americans in the 1950's and 1960's, and which we have seen in the Balkans at the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century and in Africa after the successful independence movements of various “tribes” trapped together within a political map that did not reflect their cultural and historical realities. This notion of fraternity is what Nussbaum comes near to describing as “jingoism.”\footnote{23} But if fraternity of this variety leads to the “danger” of jingoism, the more apt question becomes not “How do we quash fraternity?” but “How do we control inflamed fraternal sentiments?”

If it is the case that political compact is only one leg of the two legged structure of citizenship, the other leg being this notion of fraternity, than it is clear that the political compact is a necessary but not sufficient condition for sustaining a political community, unless it is possible to argue that a bloodless and autonomic political community, one devoid of fellow feeling, is achievable, desirable and sustainable (I think that no such argument can be taken seriously). But while the political compact is a positive instrument that determines those who are included and those who are excluded from its privileges, the notion of fraternity cannot be so arbitrarily limited without some moral justification for doing so. In other words, what justifies one in establishing fraternity only with those within the confines of the compact?

\footnote{22}{John Rawls, \textit{A Theory of Justice} (Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1971), 105.}

\footnote{23}{FLC, pg. 14.}
This depends upon what fraternity actually means. Of course, on one account (and we will see this is Nussbaum’s), provided we adopt and hold to a conception of the person as a free and autonomous moral agent, containing an intrinsic moral worth (i.e., dignity), nothing justifies it. It would in fact be a moral breech to arbitrarily withhold fellow feeling from others simply by virtue of their being a participant in a political compact other than one’s own. Such a person, merely by virtue of his citizenship of another political community (to which, he is also attached by fraternal feelings, let us suppose) is yet entitled to our recognition as a moral agent of equal worth. On such an account the boundaries forged by political compacts cannot be such as to interfere with our obligations to conduct ourselves morally in the world external to our own political community. Such a position clearly requires that the mutual obligations we have as citizens within the political community do not exhaust our obligations as human beings. Further, while it might seem that this position is hinged to a deontological view, it is noteworthy that a similar ethical sentiment, if not an argument, is expressed in Christian doctrine, notably in the New Testament parable of the Samaritan on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho. This well known New Testament parable expresses the sentiment of the moral cosmopolitan, as it answers the question “Who is my neighbor?” in a way that insists all persons are, at the very least in times of need. The remarkable feature of this parable is that the person who proved himself a true neighbor was of a people – the Samaritans – who were despised by the larger Hebrew nation, although the Samaritans were a Semitic people themselves. However, it is true of course that neighborliness and sentiment, though not to be discounted, are not equivalent to citizenship. As well, a tenable distinction can be drawn between fraternity and citizenship on the one hand, and moral obligation toward all human beings on the other, without deriding the special moral natures of either. The distinction can be generally summed-up in the Greek distinction between two notions of love: eros (which captures fraternity) on the one hand and agape (neighborly care and regard) on the other as Robert Pinsky points out in his criticisms of Nussbaum (see § III).

On a moral level, the agapic recognition of others outside of the political community/compact entails not a

---


25 This distinction should not be thought to preclude eros extending to persons outside of the bounds of community or of agape being limited only to inter-community relations. Indeed, cosmopolitans to some degree seek to foment just the conditions whereby persons extend eros as far as possible in ever wider circles. By drawing the distinction between eros and agape we are at best making an important generalization about the types of loves that most “naturally” emerge due to the nature of the reciprocal commitments of various types of human relations.
static recognition or observance of their moral standing as human beings. (This is one point concerning which
Nussbaum’s argument goes off the rails, as we will see.) For often that recognition requires action when
circumstances require, provided the ability to act is present and the action would not create serious
countervailing moral breeches. That action can take one of two forms: individualistic or communal. Let us
take as an example, a situation in which humanitarian aid is required in a foreign country.

First, we may decide to act as individuals to effect a change in the condition of the foreign person or persons
requiring some form of assistance (say, to help address conditions created by drought or flood). For example,
we could write a check to a relief agency operated within such person or persons’ country. Or we could effect
a change by appealing to the other members of our own political community, to our fellow citizens, in the hopes
of inciting in them a recognition of their own obligation to assist. This could be effected in the form of an
organized check writing campaign, or it may take the form of a grass roots movement the result of which is the
passage of relief legislation authorizing governmental organs to utilize the collective resources of the state to
assist the foreigners.

In either case, however, those receiving aid cannot be seen to be obtaining it on the basis of their positive legal
citizenship. The foreigners have no duties to the political community granting aid or to any persons within the
aid-granting community, and the grantors impose no conditions upon them for the receipt of such aid. Note also
that the foreigners do not have a shared history of struggle, or shared blood and experiences such as to create
a sense of fraternity. The act is not a political one, but is purely humanitarian (agape). What is the difference?
Is there a difference?

Citizenship derives from the shared needs of individuals who are generally bounded by mutually accepted
customs, blood ties (at least often) and legal and political sensibilities, and who work for the commonweal.
That work entails sacrifices, sometimes of life itself, but usually in the form of military conscription,
intermittent political participation and taxation of their wealth or income. These sacrifices are not made and
are not expected to be made by non-citizens. In the course of protecting and preserving the commonweal, even

26 I will use the word “foreign” to denote a person outside of a political community.
in the face of social imperfections, citizens produce a shared history and mutual loyalties toward the members of the compact. The sense of fraternity of which Rawls speaks is, in part, the emotional determination to maintain the commonweal and protect it from those who would destroy it or who would at least be indifferent to its existence. There is, quite naturally, a sense of kindredness and or patriotism which emerges, and quite naturally so, in my view. Cosmopolites cannot be seen to dismiss these commitments, this fraternal feeling, while in pursuit of the establishment of broader circles of inclusiveness of a kind that would lead to the kind of humanitarian mobilization described above, wherein we cease seeing the foreigner as foreigner, overlooking all political compacts, and merely see him as a fellow human (an attempt, in other words, to turn agape into eros). The cosmopolite must recognize the nature of the two potent sentiments which motivate and perpetuate citizenship and patriotism (not to say jingoism) on the one hand, and those which compel humanitarian responses in us, on the other hand.

Before wrestling with the need to reconcile these sentiments, I will let John Urry, of Lancaster University, set the stage:

First, the concept of the citizen seems bound up with that of the nation-state-society, so that if societies are no longer powerful entities then there would appear not to be citizens in the sense of citizenship [commonly understood]. It would seem that citizens require societies and states and the mutual antagonisms that they generate. Without them in quite the same form it may be that we are witnessing the slow death of the national citizen, just as the claim for citizenship seems to have become so extraordinarily widespread.

Second, many appeals within the media are concerned to develop a sense of planetary responsibility rather than responsibility for particular locales. This is of course a relatively new notion and is one which appears to distinguish humans from other species. However, all previous citizenships have been based upon antagonism between those inside and those outside, upon identifying the non-citizens, the other, the enemy. We can thus ask whether a sense of global citizenship is a historically unique notion which is not in fact based on the contestation between global citizens and others. So although global citizens are well aware of
difference, has a conception of citizenship developed which does not presume an enemy, an other? Or alternatively does the lack of an “enemy” for the global citizen mean that such a citizenship will never develop on any significant scale - there are no global citizens because there is nobody to be excluded? 27

§ III. Rooting Citizenship: Two Kinds of Political “Citizenship”

Urry’s questions, though dark, deserve an answer. He sets the very notion of citizenship within the realm real historical political considerations, where many political philosophers and scientists would argue is the only place it belongs. Implicit in Urry’s observations is the belief that citizenship as such emerged and evolved for quite pragmatic reasons, and that the modern notion of what citizenship entails – take the Rawlsian version, for example – evolved through a historical career that cannot be severed from the logic of its genesis. The pragmatic reasons of which I speak have to do, ultimately, with the conditions that prevailed prior thereto. One may reasonably conclude that those conditions were some version of a “state of nature,” or perhaps just the tyranny of sovereigns who were “invested” (“self-invested”?) with too many “rights” and too much power. If citizenship arose out of a need to address local political concerns essentially by granting greater control over the outcome of political and administrative decisions that would affect those who would be citizens (and thereby granting greater ownership of political decisions taken), it is hard to see how the concept of citizenship can be appropriated for use by cosmopolites. The logic of citizenship remains a local logic, i.e. a conservative logic of local identity and autonomy.

What the cosmopolite would seem to need is a new category of person, of one who is politically engaged and who is at least self-described in terms of those engagements. What she would seem to need, as well, are mechanisms for her engagement that go beyond sentiment and that allow her to actually effect changes in the world that extend beyond the actual political compact of which she is a member. What she needs, if her cosmopolitanism is to be more than sentiment, is to convince her political community to extend some of the

27 John Urry, Globalization and Citizenship (draft), published by the Department of Sociology, Lancaster University (UK) at: http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc009ju.html
The State remains at the center of the political imagination of citizens even within democratic countries. Its role is seen as pre-eminent rather than as functional, as one among a group of critical political organs.

The Nature of Cosmopolitan Loyalties

Martha Nussbaum wants to render actual political citizenship morally irrelevant insofar as she would render such things as ethnicity morally irrelevant. Thus, she would equate patriotism with a misguided emotional attachment to at best a morally penultimate community. There are several problems with this, even for people like me who find merit in Nussbaum’s political sentiments.

First, I note that Nussbaum explicitly employs a Kantian ethics to back up her cosmopolite sentiments. She wants to peel back what she, pace Seneca, calls the “accidents” of place, birth and privilege and expose and ascribe moral worth primarily to the “kernel” of self to which the predicate “dignity” supposedly inherently attaches. But on this same Kantian account, not only does the predicate dignity so attach, but so also autonomy. This notion of autonomy connotes the capacity for self-governance on moral matters. Kant speaks to the notion of autonomy in his moral philosophy as well as in his quasi-political and fully political writings (See Kant’s essays What is Enlightenment? and Perpetual Peace). But in recognizing the self as imbued with unalienable dignity and autonomy some cosmopolites, such as Nussbaum, have not gone far enough. We have but a moral skeleton, a moral skeleton for real, flesh and blood moral actors. These actors make their own decisions about how they choose to live their lives. As rational animals, they will inevitably form alliances in which there is mutual reliance for the protection of interests. They will be members of families, they will form friendships, they will participate in communal life, they will fight for their religious and political and personal beliefs when opposed or assaulted by others – beliefs
constructed, perhaps, over generations of narrative tradition. *Sapere Aude!* is Kant’s battle cry for dignified, autonomous selves. This battle cry implies action, not static gazing into ones dignified navel.

Nussbaum would seem to want to claim no *transitivity* from the mere fact of dignified autonomy to the acts and choices of selves who possess these qualities. On this account, only a second rate moral value attaches to the institutions or cultural manifestations established by such selves; they are *merely accidental*, *merely* contingent, unlike the static dignified self that, somehow, remains the same through time and space. Nussbaum, I would argue, has it half right (antifoundationalists like Richard Rorty would argue that there is metaphysical kernel, no independent self that survives unaffected by contingency through time and space). I would argue that she has it half right because our sympathy, one of my important pillars of a moral and political cosmopolitanism, attaches to the *human animal simpliciter* (the body as well as its individuality, its “self”), regardless of specific cultural or political predicates. It is that body that lives out culture and that relates to others like itself, that exhibits a sense of itself in the same manner as I, that is the primary focus of morality. It is the human animal, in its materiality, that feels pain, that can be killed, that is the bearer of hopes and fears and culture itself, and that provides the possibility of the “self.” But where I differ from Nussbaum is in assigning a second-rate status to human choice, decisions, traditions, preferences. This is akin to claiming that the value of a thing is not what it does, but only *that it is*. It is akin to claiming that the capacity and right to choose is *infinitely* more morally relevant than the actual choices of actors, whatever those choices may be. This view differs significantly from Aristotle’s (and my own), who held that the ability to deliberate about our acts (*prohairesis*) is the critical “capacity” that gives rise to well ordered cultures and civilizations (or the *polis*), but that it is because cultures and civilizations (agglomerations of choices made by moral actors, past and present and projected into the future) arise out of that capacity that we should take them seriously and give them substantial moral worth. Aristotle does not carve human moral worth into segments, valuing most highly mere potentiality. He was much more pragmatic than that and he saw that morality (*virtue*) itself can only be understood, or at least best understood, in terms of *praxis*, the highest manifestation of which are the actions

---

28 *Prohairesis* is essentially deliberative choice, and is an important term in Aristotle’s ethics. Actions not chosen pursuant to prohairetic deliberation cannot be said to be virtuous and certainly not virtuous in “an unqualified sense.” See *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1145a.
leading toward the eudaimonic\textsuperscript{29} life for the individual and the establishment and maintenance of a political community for one’s fellow citizens as well as for oneself. For Aristotle, it made no sense to talk about the static moral worth of human beings apart from their actions.

We do not live in a world in which the only thing of moral worth is a good will or a capacity for autonomy. Such a world is only the abstraction of a rationalist fantasy, a world in which morality exists for its own sake. We are not born to gaze at our moral navels, to wrap all conceptions of moral worth into a mere capacity or a transcendental moral quality. Moral value also attaches to what we choose to create as moral actors. Further, if our autonomy as moral agents is to be given such prominence, the choices we make necessarily are imbued

\textsuperscript{29} For Aristotle eudaimonia was the culmination of human good, and the goal of all virtuous human activity.

\textsuperscript{30} In my view, all cosmopolitans are cultural deflationists. They all understand the radically contingent natures of all cultural expressions. To that degree they are ironists in the Rortian sense, maintaining a “final vocabulary” that they employ in negotiating the world, but always entertaining doubts about those vocabularies, always willing to allow for the possibility that they may need to be abandoned for new ones if necessary. In this regard, cosmopolitans cannot be cultural conservatives, although they may argue strongly for those political and cultural expressions and vocabularies that they believe are valuable and useful.
with moral content. Every act and institution may be seen to have moral content. There is then, clearly, moral content to citizenship, especially to citizenship by assent or choice, as well as to actions which display loyalty to a particular community. Indeed, one in fact has a duty to such community, a moral duty, at the very least insofar as one ought not be a free-rider within or upon that community. Nussbaum’s notion of “accident” goes too far in the wrong direction because it fails to take into account the reciprocal nature of communal membership and the anthropology of communal formation. One’s community provides a language, physical resources and existential orientation. These are things which may not be taken lightly or viewed as expendable. Further, at some point in our maturation process we choose membership in our communities, whether tacitly by fiat or in a full positive display. While our being Americans or Australians may be, in some sense, accidental, American and Australian civilization yet remain expressions of human morality that can not be severed from mere selfhood and assigned a second-rate moral status. As George Herbert Mead (Mind, Self and Society, 1934) and John Dewey have made clear, at least to my satisfaction, there is no self without society (i.e., no reflexive consciousness), and there are no societies without individual human beings.31 Human experience and culture are completely contemporaneous expressions of the dynamic between self and other. Mead’s conception of the self ends the unnecessary tension between the self as a dignified cipher and cultural context as accident, and allows society/culture to be seen along the same moral continuum. Mead’s conception gives a cosmopolitan morality and politics legs to stand on that have both of their feet on the ground, since worry about the metaphysical priority of self or of society is done away with.

The choice we have to remain a member of a cultural or political community is an important moral choice. As much as we may choose to remain a member, we may also opt out if we wish, however painful and traumatic that might be. Opting out could be as simple as renunciation and repatriation; or, where one is held to one’s

---

31 For Mead, the self that arises gradually through a progressive widening of the scope of human involvement must never be conceived as a mere body but rather as a social entity emerging in a social process of development from simple intercourse (speaking and gesturing) to the process of identification with the "generalized other." "The conscious self," John Dewey comments, "was to him the world of nature first taken up into social relations and then dissolved to form a new self which then went forth to recreate the world of nature and social institutions."

For Mead, reflexivity was the very essence of the self. Individual selves exist only relative to others. Imagination was also critical since it is through a self’s ability to understand and enter into the attitudes of others that his self becomes an object of his own reflection. Constant reflexivity, the self as both subject and object, is the basis of social life. Individuality is a result of the unique combination, never the same for two people, of the attitude of others that form the generalized other.
community through despotic control (where, that is, physical flight is impossible) one still can opt out intellectually and emotionally seeking opportunities when and if they come, to resist and undermine. It may even take the form of suicide in the most extreme cases, such as in the cases of Walter Benjamin or John Brown (who effectively committed suicide in his opposition to state-sanctioned slavery inasmuch as his Harper’s Ferry raid proved to be a suicidal act). But opting out is itself, of course, morally significant since we may be, by renouncing our community, violating a duty to reform it.

These ideas in effect reconstruct cosmopolitanism in a manner that has been called for by other cosmopolitan thinkers. In her essay *Community, Identity and World Citizenship*, Janna Thompson argues as follows:

> How should the cosmopolitan project be pursued in the light of communitarian criticisms? Communitarians give us no reason to think that a post-Kantian moral philosophy has to give up hope of justifying and promoting universal moral ideals. Their objections to liberalism are not objections to the basic idea behind liberal morality – that individuals are of intrinsic value and have equal moral worth – or to theories of right or justice. What their criticisms imply is that more attention has to be given to the question of how these liberal ideals can be realized in a world society where individuals not only have self-interests but also commitments to community. This means that the nature of cosmopolitan justice is going to depend on how these commitments can develop and change.

> Cosmopolitanism must somehow take into account the particular situation and loyalties of individuals, as well as the contingencies of political struggle.\(^{32}\)

Nussbaum’s argument that we should form the bonds of world citizenship across by seriously discounting predicates or accidents of race, ethnicity, gender and religion is a claim that we might first do well to unpack. Are these accidents, these predicates, unimportant morally? Race, ethnicity and religion at least are matters of

choice and likely, on many levels, are matters of intense profundity because they are often the repositories of promises to others (race, on my account, is a pure social construction and has no genetic meaning, and so my designation of race as a ‘choice’). To be a Christian or Muslim, for example, is to take-up the burdens of brotherly-sisterly obligation within the “community” of Christians or Muslims; it is not merely the mutual assent to a metaphysics. They, as well, represent others’ promises to “us.”

World Citizenship as Confraternity

It would seem that Nussbaum’s notion of world citizen and her metaphysics of the self run into some difficulties. So too her version of the cosmopolite is doomed to a velleity unless he can be rescued by the establishment of concrete institutions and organs that can be the stepping stones on which his cosmopolitan vision is approached and worked-out. It is fortunate for Nussbaum and those like myself who share her political hopes that such stepping stones in fact exist and are becoming more profuse and more powerful. The cosmopolite becomes a tenable political creature once we leave off the comparison with citizenship according to the model of the polis or, in contemporary politics, of nation-states, as discussed above. By this standard the idea of the cosmopolite fails, drowning in a sea of sentimentalism and vagueness. If “world citizenship” is recast as a confraternity based upon interexistence, as defined above, rather than as a creation of the positive political compact of a “single” people the idea of world citizen begins to take substantial form. For the notion of confraternity, however, one more thing is required – a de-centering of states in the political imagination of citizens as the principal foci of political action.

Confraternity is the political sentiment that attends interexistence, as above discussed, a sentiment that bids us to view ourselves as potential or actual actors in the political affairs of others, whether against injustice or in effecting various structural or political reforms. The sentiment of confraternity is robust in those involved in a variety of NGOs or in social action campaigns of international scope. These persons place themselves directly in the nexus of responsibilities connected with the lives of those they might possibly affect. For these

---

33 I have written an article, “Should we conserve the notion of race?” that will appear in a forthcoming book Race and Pragmatism, ed. Bill Lawson and Donald Koch (Indiana University Press - September 2002). Also, Anthony Appiah has addressed the scientific fallacy of race and argues that at best race is a social construct.
persons, inaction as a default mode regarding the plight or struggles of distal peoples is a form of tacit approval of their plight. As they see their fate as tied to those who struggle, inaction does not remain an option. The default mode is action and the standard question is “Why aren’t we?” rather than “Why should we?” Confraternity, as does interexistence, embraces the Foucaultian analysis of power by recognizing the need to participate within the currents of power that constantly surround us. This is not a formula for either conservative or progressive politics, but for action itself. However, it is hard to imagine that the idea of confraternity, and certainly of interexistence, will appeal to cultural or political conservatives.

Confraternity, then, is not a mere sentiment since it vigorously seeks to employ global institutions to effect change in the lives and circumstances of people. These institutions become the political base for cosmopolitan confraternals, who seek to move beyond mere political desiderata and take direct political action to affect institutions by their efforts. The cosmopolitan confraternal’s view of the political landscape is that captured by the figure on page 28. It is a view that de-centers the state, for example, and that expands the horizon of political relevance and concern.

_The Political Organs of World Citizenship: Local and Distal_

Although such de-centering is important, it should not be understood to mean a radical shift away from states as the predominant centers of political action. Indeed, the first institutional organ of world citizenship is the nation-state itself (or its homologous counterpart). This should not be forgotten in discussing cosmopolitan democracy or cosmopolitanism, although the focus often fixes on legal and administrative institutions external to the state. By decentering the nation-state, _for specific purposes_, it should not be the intention to strip it of its critical traditional _uses_, i.e. the protection and promotion of the commonwealth. The decentering is just that – a way to remove the state from _the_ center of _all_ deliberations that effect the health and welfare of its citizens.\(^{34}\) The idea is to create a conceptual scheme whereby the state assumes a critical but functional role,

---

\(^{34}\) As Anthony Appiah argues (FLC, 29): “There are many reasons to think that living in political communities narrower than the species is better for us than would be our engulfment in a single world-state, a cosmopolis of which we cosmopolitans would be not figurative but literal citizens. It is, in fact, precisely this celebration of cultural variety that distinguishes the cosmopolitan from some of the other heirs of Enlightenment
as the heart or the liver performs a critical and functional role in the body. So the state (or homologous political organ) must remain a key ingredient in cosmopolitan thought.

However, since Bretton Woods political organs have emerged that permit participation by peoples of the world regardless of their status as citizens of nation-states, although at times they function as tools of states. These political organs are the multilateral organizations (MLOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or that carry out certain political agendas with the intent of effecting social change or reform and of influencing public policy in both proximate and distal jurisdictions, or policies of multilateral organizations themselves. MLOs such as the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations have a substantive role to play, now more than ever before in the history of civilization, in creating level, democratic playing fields for the peoples of the world, as well as to assure that basic necessities for life are obtained on a global scale. It is too early to tell for sure, but a possible future can be sketched in outline in which the interexistence of peoples will eclipse certain areas of nation-state sovereignty to a noticeable degree (i.e. to the degree that legislatures and heads of state will become more accustomed to and more comfortable with consulting with distal political institutions in the formulation of internal policy). Indeed, the idea of “soft sovereignty” is already being discussed in international foreign policy circles as a viable alternative to the idea of “heirophanic” sovereignty that precludes penetration by those not party to the political compact that establishes the nation-state, kingdom or similar political community.

humanism. . . . It is because humans live best on a smaller scale that we should defend not just the state, but the county, the town, the street, the business, the craft, the profession, and the family, as communities, as circles among the many circles that are narrower than the human horizon, that are appropriate spheres of moral concern. We should, as cosmopolitans, defend the right of others to live in democratic states with rich possibilities of association within and across their borders, states of which they can be patriotic citizens. And, as cosmopolitans, we can claim that right for ourselves.”

35 “Bretton Woods” institutions are the collective name for the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), institutions established in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA.

36 The Bretton Woods Project, for example, is a watchdog that regularly monitors, critiques and lobbies Bretton Woods institutions. <www.brettonwoodsproject.org>.

37 The phrase “soft sovereignty” has been used as both a pejorative and as a policy goal in various political debates regarding self-determination, most notably in the Balkans, in Palestine and in Canada with respect to the Quebec succession question. My use of the term here sidesteps these extant political issues, and is being put forward as a general concept that captures the notion of a relaxation of more or less absolute sovereign claim to the right to unilaterally determine the conditions for and policies of a subject population pursuant to a positive political
Governments are being placed under surveillance by NGOs and MLOs to an unprecedented extent, and global communications via, principally, the internet is making surreptitious actions against the subjects of states increasing risky to the perpetrators. Images of Sudanese slavery and the brutalization of Tibetans, for example, are now plain for the world to see almost instantaneously, although this does not preclude such human rights abuses or provide remedies for them.

However, at the 52nd session of the General Assembly of the United Nations a decision was made to convene the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The conference was held in Rome in the summer of 1998, fifty years after the recognition of the need for such a court. According to the United Nations, an international criminal court is the missing adjudicatory link in the world legal structure that allows perpetrators of serious crimes against humanity to go unpunished. Without such a legal organ for dealing with individual actions (i.e., criminal acts of natural persons, not of states), genocide and other human rights abuses often get cloaked under the hard sovereignty of the states in which such crimes take place – states that are at times aiders and abettors or sponsors of those crimes. There have been many instances of such crimes where no individuals have been held accountable:

In Cambodia in the 1970s, an estimated 2 million people were killed by the Khmer Rouge. In armed conflicts in Mozambique, Liberia, El Salvador and other countries, there has been tremendous loss of civilian life, including horrifying numbers of unarmed women and children. Massacres of civilians continue in Algeria and the Great Lakes region of Africa. 38

These, of course, are just a few examples of severe human rights abuses. After the Rome conference, and after intense negotiations, 120 countries voted to adopt the treaty to establish the ICC (what I refer to in the graphics as International Judicial Bodies or “IJBs.” The International Court of Justice, or World Court, is another such compact.

38 <www.un.org/law/icc.general/overview.htm>
body; however the World Court adjudicates disputes between states and has no authority to prosecute individuals within sovereign states\textsuperscript{39}). Seven countries voted against it (including the United States, along with China, Iraq, and Israel), and 21 countries abstained. Pursuant to the Resolution, 60 countries are needed to ratify the treaty. As of December 31, 2001, 48 countries have ratified it.\textsuperscript{40} The United States eventually signed the Rome Statute but has not ratified the Treaty, and ratification is being fought by various factions in Congress concerned with overreaching by the ICC Prosecutor.

The existence of an international criminal court will be another perforation in the stone wall of hard or “heirophanic” sovereignty and, if established, will be one more international organ that will necessarily lead to a redefinition of sovereignty itself in perhaps the not too distant future, although this will not come without a fight from traditional statists. The various post-World War II collaborative efforts at economic, monetary and trade harmonization (the North American Free Trade Agreement, GAAT and its successor World Trade Organization, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Community (EC), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) (South America’s largest trading block), and the recent retail establishment of the Euro as the sole currency of participating European countries (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland) create a common and material link between the social, economic and political futures of the affected nation-states and so their peoples, with others surely to follow.

Nor is it any longer the case that governments are the last word regarding the general welfare of their subjects.

\textsuperscript{39} Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, Seventh Revised Edition (London: Routledge, 1997), 282

\textsuperscript{40} The following is an excerpt from President William Jefferson Clinton’s December 31, 2001 statement on the establishment of the ICC: “Under the Rome Treaty, the International Criminal Court (ICC) will come into being with the ratification of 60 governments, and will have jurisdiction over the most heinous abuses that result from international conflict, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The Treaty requires that the ICC not supercede or interfere with functioning national judicial systems; that is, the ICC Prosecutor is authorized to take action against a suspect only if the country of nationality is unwilling or unable to investigate allegations of egregious crimes by their nationals. The U.S. delegation to the Rome Conference worked hard to achieve these limitations, which we believe are essential to the international credibility and success of the ICC.”
Other governments and multinationals have increasing de facto and de jure authority in such matters. Although maligned at times by some progressive elements (and sometimes for good reason), organizations like the World Bank provide enormous assistance to the world’s poorer peoples and countries. The World Bank is a leading external funder of education programs in developing countries, is a leader in fighting global financial corruptions, is one of the largest funders of bio-diversity projects, remains the largest external funder of health programs and is the worlds largest funder AIDS/HIV programs. It is also noteworthy that most World Bank funding comes from the international capital markets (via the issuance of credits), which means that private citizens and investors are indirectly responsible for the global programs the World Bank finances. In its 2001 fiscal year, the World Bank loaned $17.3 billion to developing countries. 25% of those funds went into human development programs, 21% to the creation of basic infrastructure, and 13% to agricultural and environmental programs. Given the average GDPs of the countries assisted, these are quite large sums, and although there have been criticisms of the World Bank’s and IMF’s structural adjustment demands for developing countries that receive assistance, the evaporation of this money from the pipeline of those who need it would be extremely problematic.

The erosion of state sovereignty has also come from “globalization” – a catch phrase for fluid flows of money, goods, people, information and ideas across political borders. In this fluid exchange the business corporation and its interests have in some sense usurped governments’ control of commerce as well as fiscal and monetary policy. This has created problems and raised real political, moral and cultural questions where countries and locales have little preparedness for the rapid flows of, particularly, money and information (not to mention alien cultural notions and axiologies). As Peter Drucker, the premier management thinker of the last century had predicted in 1993, these changes undermine “the very foundation of the nation-state. In fact, it ceases to be a

41 Source: The World Bank.

42 There is a large body of literature that exists that criticizes the manner in which structural adjustment programs work. Structural adjustment policy packages – including privatization, slashing of government spending, trade liberalization and opening to foreign investment – often place severe economic hardships on poorer countries for which, because of local exigencies, do not respond to neo-classical economic remedies in the time frame the packages require, if at all. On the other hand, since so much of the money received comes from private bond holders who seek repayment, some type of progressive economic programs must attach to the loans. At times, political corruption and ineptitude in the highest offices play a significant role in the inability for structural adjustment to work.
‘nation-state,’ and becomes a ‘state’ plain and simple, and administrative rather than a political unit. Internationalism, regionalism, and tribalism between them are rapidly creating a new polity, a new complex political structure, without precedent. To use a mathematical metaphor, the post-capitalist polity has three vectors, each pulling in a different direction. But an equation with three vectors has no one solution. In the meantime, a the old English saying has it, ‘the work of government must go on.’ The only institutions we have so far for this work are those of the nation-state and its government. The first political task of the post-capitalist polity must be to restore the performance capacity of government, which the Megastate has so seriously diminished.”

In recognition of these problems, in July of 2000 the United Nations introduced The Global Compact. Under the leadership of the Secretary General, global leaders from business, civil society and labor launched the Global Compact as an initiative to bolster responsible business conduct around the globe (it is coincidental that The Global Compact came on the heels of the Seattle WTO protests of December 1999). The Global Compact challenges businesses to inculcate and live out in their conduct nine principles in the areas of human rights, labor standards and the environment. According to the UN, the aim is “to help strengthen the social pillars within which any market, including the global market, must be embedded if it is to survive and thrive. The principles derive form the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labor Organization’s Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work, and the Rio Principles on environment and development.

The 9 principles of The Global Compact to be employed by businesses are:

One. Support and respect the protection of international human rights within their sphere of influence;

Two. Make sure their own corporations are not complicit in human rights abuses;

Three. Uphold freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;

---

Four. The elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labor;

Five. The effective abolition of child labor;

Six. The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation;

Seven. Support a cautionary approach to environmental challenges;

Eight. Undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and

Nine. Encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.

All of the above non-governmental or multilateral institutions or initiatives have their histories of abuses, failures, and ineffectiveness, but so do states and they, when considered together with a host of others not mentioned here, serve to demonstrate that a commitment to such initiatives in various forms can unite Indians with Canadians, French with Chinese, and Jamaican with Moroccan and create such an overlapping nexus of important if not vital interests and relationships that a large overlapping consensus as regards critical human interests seems inevitable. Those who see the value in such a nexus are what come the closest to true political cosmopolites, inasmuch as their feelings of solidarity and fraternity with citizens of other states now have a range of political, cultural and economic organs through which to concretize that sense of solidarity in effective ways. Through them a de jure cosmopolitanism emerges — through multinational corporations, IABs, NGOs, MLOs, trading blocks and unified currencies – and it is now conceivable to view the state in more, if not purely, pragmatic terms, i.e. as an organ that performs certain functions and has a certain mission in bettering the human condition widely conceived, rather than as the axis of shared sentimental fraternity, although it (or something like it) will undoubtedly remain such an axis. Indeed, this does not mean that nation-states will come to an end, and the announcement of the death of the nation-state is probably ill-conceived. What will most likely emerge is a more functional understanding of the nation-state vis-a-vis multilateral, civil, religious and other institutions of administration and culture.

THE PRECEDING ADDS some critically needed flesh to the philological and sentimental bones of Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan vision, although it is clear to me even from her opening essay in FLC that Nussbaum is aware of these trends. It as well addresses political cosmopolitans, such as Daniele Archibugi, Technological Director of the Italian National Research Council, who states that “[t]he cosmopolitan perspective is
deliberately ingenuous. Compared to Realpolitik, with its military, financial and political means, cosmopolitanism has no other power but the ideas it puts forward.44 This can be said of even the ideas associated with democracy. It is clear that cosmopolitanism has more power than that, and the institutions that have just been discussed demonstrate that fact. They carry out the cosmopolitan agenda by other names.

*Martha Nussbaum and Her Critics*

I want to turn to the concluding essay in FLC, in which Nussbaum responds to the criticism that she is engaged merely in a sentimental fancy and is offering us nothing more than an effete humanism. But first, to some specific criticism from her respondents in FLC, to add to those above regarding her opening essay:

Benjamin R. Barber: “Patriotism has its pathologies, but so does cosmopolitanism. Because [Nussbaum] misjudges these two elements, she is unduly alarmed about what has been a remarkably successful and undogmatic constitutional exercise in American exceptionalism and unduly frightened of efforts to refocus American patriotism and community in an era of individualism and privatized markets. In an overly tribalized world, cosmopolitanism might be a useful counterpoint. But ours is a world disenchanted in which Gemeinschaft and neighborhood have for the most part been supplanted by Gesellschaft and bureaucracy. What we require are healthy, democratic forms of local community and civic patriotism rather than abstract universalisms and the thin gruel of contract relations. (31)

Richard Falk: “The Stoic-Kantian vectors of a cosmopolitan orientation assume an ethical context for globalism affirmations that is increasingly difficult to reconcile with the actuality of contemporary globalism. True, the cosmopolitan outlook is explicitly ethical and humanist on a global scale, but it is not sufficiently distinguished from or even aware of globalist tendencies that are integrating experience across boundaries at a rapid rate. To project a visionary cosmopolitanism without

---

44 This I take to be an unfortunate slip of the tongue, since Archibugi is a serious cosmopolite engaged in “hard headed” analysis of how cosmopolitan democracy can be forged with concrete institutions. He is certainly far ahead of me in addressing the issues raised herein. See his essay, “Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy” in *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy.*
addressing the subversive challenge of the market-driven globalism currently being promoted by transnational corporations and banks, as well as currency dealers and casino capitalists, is to risk indulging a contemporary form of fuzzy innocence. A credible cosmopolitanism has to be combined with a critique of the ethically deficient globalism embodied in neoliberal modes of thought and the globalism that is being enacted in a manner that minimizes the ethical and visionary content of conceiving of the world as a whole. . . . Without a more careful clarification, there is a danger of conflating the emergent regionalisms and globalism that are reconstituting the world with those exalted cosmopolitan expectations and hopes that invoke the prospect of genuine ‘species consciousness’ and draw upon classical images of an ethically unified human community.” (57)

Nathan Glazer: “[Nussbaum objects to] the sentiment, ‘I am an Indian first, a citizen of the world second.’ This suggest that something like world citizenship should replace American citizenship. . . . I have practical objections to this, but also, I believe, principled objections. The practical objections are immediately raised by the example of [Clinton changing US policy to favor refugees from Communist countries equally with those from Communist countries]. Is our government to treat the fleeing Cubans the way it would, for example, American citizens, permanent residents, immigrants who have gone through the proper procedures, or refugees who have established their bona fides as escaping from persecution? If so, then what distinctions should it make among those who wish to settle in this country? Should it make none? Should it defer in the matter of immigration policy to some world body, a committee of the United Nations, perhaps? Is this what the status of world citizenship suggests or requires?” (61-62)

Amy Guttmann: “What is Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan alternative? To teach students that their primary allegiance is to the community of human beings in the entire world. Where is there any such community? There are human beings throughout the world and they are entitle to be treated as equals, according to the principles of right and justice. If this is what Nussbaum means by community she is agreeing with what democratic humanists say. If she means to refer to a community with claims that take precedence over these rights, a community that requires its members to respect those claims ‘above all’ because they are ‘above all’ citizens of the world, then she is recommending a vision that
we should reject. It is another parochial form of nationalism, this time on a global scale. Its parochialism may be concealed by the fact that Nussbaum supplies little or no content to the world community’s values. . . . By giving content to these potentially compatible ideas, we can find the common ground that we need to move beyond more abstract slogans. . . . Our obligations as democratic citizens go beyond our duties as politically unorganized individuals, because our capacity to act effectively to further justice increases when we are empowered as citizens, and so therefore does our responsibility to act to further justice. Democratic citizens have institutional means at their disposal that solitary individuals, or citizens of the world only, do not. Some of those institutional means are international in scope (the United Nations being the most prominent example), but even those tend to depend on the cooperation of sovereign societies for effective action. . . . By teaching students to deliberate about justice as democratic citizens, not only as individuals, schools can encourage citizens to support effective institutional ways of moving toward a better society and a better world. Schools should also teach students that there are demands of morality and justice that do not depend on democratic citizenship for their realization – for example, the demands of family and friendship. But to teach either lesson with intellectual integrity, schools must move beyond the morally misguided and politically dangerous idea of asking us to choose between being, above all, citizens of our own society or, above all, citizens of the world. We are, above all, none of the above.” (Emphasis added.) (70-71)

Gertrude Himmelfarb: “Cosmopolitanism, Nussbaum assures us, does not involve the creation of a ‘world state.’ But in the following sentences (and repeatedly thereafter), she speaks of ‘the world citizen’ and ‘world citizenship,’ terms that have little meaning except in the context of a state. This is not a quibble, for it goes to the heart of her essay, her effort to ground a universal morality in a universal – and stateless – community. If nationality, as she says, is ‘morally irrelevant’ to the cosmopolitan ideal, so is the polity that defines the nation, and so is the idea of citizenship. And so too is all of history. And not only modern history, whose fundamental categories are nationality and statehood, but even the ancient history that is her special forte. . . . Nussbaum quotes the Stoics at some length as proponents of the idea of a universal ‘moral community’ and ‘world citizenship.’ But she quotes Aristotle not at all. Yet Aristotle’s dictum, ‘Man is by nature a political animal,’ has proved
to be far more prescient than the Stoic doctrine. Aristotle’s polis, to be sure, is not the modern state. But it is a polity. And not a world polity but a specific, historic polity, a government of laws and institutions by means of which—and only by means of which, Aristotle believed—many can consciously, rationally try to establish a just regime and pursue the good life. . . . Above all, what cosmopolitanism obscures, even denies, are the givens of life: parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition, community—and nationality. These are not ‘accidental’ attributes of the individual. They are essential attributes. We do not come into the world as free floating, autonomous individuals. We come into it with all the particular defining characteristics that go into a fully formed human being, a being with an identity.” (77)

And finally, Robert Pinsky: “My criticism of [Nussbaum’s] arid formulations is not merely stylistic, though their sterility points to their weakness. Nussbaum is a gifted writer, but the sentences she lapses into here present a view of the world that would be true only if people were not driven by emotions. These formulas about concentric circles and global community would be valid only if cultures and nations were as static and lucid as so many bar graphs and pie charts. We do share only one world and set of resources, but we cannot deal with such facts by declaring, as by UN resolutions, that we are a community. . . . I have the impression that some of the fiercest nationalisms and ethnocentrisms of the world are fueled in part by resentment of people like ourselves: happily situated members of large, powerful nations, prosperous and mobile individuals, able to serve on UN commissions, who participate in symposia, who plan the fates of other peoples while flying around the world and staying in splendid hotels. Shouldn’t this reality be the starting place of such discussions—or at least included in them? Shouldn’t we recognize that our own view, too, is local? . . . In short, Nussbaum falls into the formulation of one peculiar province, the village of the liberal managerial class. I do not mean to be excessively scornful toward this conceptual village, a realm where the folk arts are United Nations institute reports and curriculum reform committees and enlightened social administration: like other villages it has within it valuable customs and individuals. But its inhabitants characteristically fail, as Nussbaum so spectacularly fails, to achieve precisely what she calls for—understanding others, comprehending the eros of home. To put it very simply, I think that her [opening] essay fails to respect the nature of patriotism and similar forms of love.” (Emphasis added) (87-88)
These are serious attacks on Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan vision. But in her closing essay, Nussbaum formulates some important replies. For one thing, Nussbaum does come-up with a quasi-Median concept of the self and argues that a child is not born into a culture and learns to work out thin and more universal moral principles from the thick predicates of that culture, but rather learns thin principles by its interactions with the first persons in its life (142,143). This also argues against Michael Walzer’s notion in his book, *Thick and Thin*, where he similarly claim that thin universal moral commitments are subsequent to the more grounded cultural rules that we learn as members of communities. On Nussbaum’s account, the child does not only learn the language of its people, but learns the meaning of frustration, physical pain, loneliness, and despair which it can then project into a generalized other in the sense that Mead understood it. The child assumes that its feelings are felt in all persons, and thus can extend its sympathies to all persons suffering similarly. The child learns cruelty by experiencing cruelty and learns to recognize the symptoms of cruelty in other people’s lives, whether they are proximal or distal, whether they speak the same language or not. To support Nussbaum here, I would argue that Gertrude Himmelfarb is simply wrong about a child’s being born into an identity, ready made for it. There is no self that is born; selves are made. It is precisely the process of the making of selves, through various forms of informal and formal education, that Nussbaum seeks to adjust in order to create greater “sympathy” (143) for persons that are fellow citizens as well as persons who are distal and who do not share in the common projects in which citizens share.

Amy Gutman’s response to Nussbaum’s opening essay raises questions that seem less easy to dismiss. She essentially argues that it is no community that should be the subject of our “loyalties,” but justice itself, and further argues that the most effective way to achieve justice for ourselves and for other human beings is to perfect democratic practices within our own democratic communities. With justice and right as the stars to guide ourselves and with actual democratic institutions established and defended by the real flesh and blood citizens of democratic societies, the chances of effecting justice for far flung persons are enhanced. Gutmann objects to Nussbaum’s presentation of a hierarchy of communal loyalties. It seems that a principle concern here is the danger of shifting our focus from proximal democratic institutions in favor of a kind of “pipe dream” global citizenship that creates the danger that we as democrats will be insufficiently attentive to the fact that

---

democratic practices are local practices first and foremost, require a secure democratic base from which to operate, and demand constant attention. I think that this criticism has merit. Nussbaum opens herself up to this kind of criticisms by not articulating properly what a viable world citizenship might look like, as I have tried to do above with my notion of confraternity. Nussbaum does state that “in our world . . . there are many practical opportunities for world citizenship that were simply not available to the Stoics” such as NGOs and other organizations that I discuss. Yet she does not argue enough for the perfection of local democratic practices and the joint participation in further democratic practices and pursuing social justice that is most effectively done via the vehicle of states rather than as individuals. It is for this reason that I shift to a view of political cosmopolitan practices entailing states, MLOs and NGOs as functional organs for global and local justice, organs that support the efforts of one another, rather than operating as dualistic organs in a fight for turf or hierarchical moral and political primacy on the world stage. My view, rather than Nussbaum’s, seems to be a proper response to Guttman’s challenge, although Guttman’s notion of loyalty to justice per se seems dismissable as a greater abstraction than she accuses Nussbaum of conjuring..

Richard Falk raises caveats more than direct challenges to Nussbaum’s cosmopolitanism. Some of these are addressed by Peter Drucker, above. He does something in his remarks that is greatly needed, i.e. he forces us to define our terms (which so far, I myself have not done in respect of my own idea of cosmopolitanism, but will shortly). Specifically, he asks that we not conflate globalism, which is generally commercially driven, with cosmopolitanism, which is driven by concerns for social justice and the establishment of human bonds and friendships beyond our local communities and states. Nussbaum has no substantive reply to Falk’s concerns. The response that I would supply Falk might not accept, which is that any dualism between commerce and social justice is a false one (if that is where Falk is going), although drawing a distinction is important. It is false because commerce – like art, family, and sexuality – is a human practice that requires mutual cooperation on at least some level and, at its best, mutual respect, honesty and loyalty to bring about. At its best as well, it forces a better and deeper understanding of the party on the other side of the negotiating table because such deeper understanding is required. Because commerce is a form of human intercourse, other types of human bonds follow in the wake of the pursuit of trade or profit. While Falk’s distinction between globalization and cosmopolitanism is useful, it is not a distinction that should be absolutized into a dualism. Falk’s concern is with the same issues being addressed by professional ethicists and in the The Global Compact.
as well as other venues and organs.

Robert Pinsky’s embrace of patriotism as a form of *eros*, of love for one’s own, is I think proper. As I have argued above, feelings of fraternity cannot and should not be displaced (even if they could be) with some kind of bloodless commitment to a neutralized “kingdom of ends” or the view of selves as dignified ciphers. Yet I think Pinsky’s *ad hominem* labeling of Nussbaum as a member of the liberal managerial class is wrong, as well as fallacious. The incidents that give rise to the need for a UN or for promoting democratic practices in various countries – child labor, mass murder, the denial of the right to self-determination – are what give that managerial class its mission. Pinsky assumes too much in reducing such persons to their bureaucratic and written productions, replete with facts and statistics. Such bureaucratic and written productions are part of the process of creating social justice. Pinsky’s *eros* is not to be mocked, but neither are the abstractions of those critically concerned with the horrors that face so many people on the planet (and we must recall also that the god Eros was depicted as a blind child, not always responsible with his arrows). Nussbaum has a reply to Pinsky that she draws from literature:

In Walter Scott’s famous poem, on which I was raised, the non-patriot is a man ‘with soul so dead’ that he never could be the subject of ‘minstrel raptures.’ The poem suggests that all true poetry is patriotic in inspiration and in theme. Several of my critics would appear to be followers of Scott, and I am cast as that person whose empty humanism is destined to go to its grave ‘unwept, unhonored, and unsung.’ I suggest, instead, that large-souled and compelling art is generally concerned with the recognition of the common in the strange and the strange in the common – and that narrowly patriotic art, by contrast, is frequently little more than kitsch, idolatry. Scott’s poem is kitsch. Much of Rudyard Kipling’s poetry is kitsch. Most of the products of most poet laureates in office are kitsch. (140)

Benjamin Barber makes a kind of Heideggerian appeal for the re-establishment of a *volk* sensibility (*Gemeinschaft*) over the “thin gruel” of civil society and legalistic bonds devoid of tradition (*Gesellschaft*). Here, the only limits that cosmopolitanism would impose on *Gemeinschaft* are a sense of cultural humility and
contingency. That’s all that is required to keep *Gemeinschaft* from becoming ethnocentrism or jingoism. This will allow a *volk* to be at peace with itself and its own traditions and yet open to the possibility of change – the possibility that there may in fact be better ways to be and to do.

So where does all of this leave us. I prefer an overall conception of political cosmopolitanism that contains at least these elements:

1. Local cultures and practices of peoples are morally relevant aspects of their lives and must be respected not as mere accidents but as expressions of moral dignity;

2. The recognition of the capacity of all sane human beings to reason reflectively regarding and to carry out their own conceptions of the good and their own personal life projects is the moral cornerstone of all human intercourse;

3. Selves are formed, not born, and societies and individuals depend reciprocally upon one another for their existence;

4. Human beings, as contingent creatures, both err and have the capacity to change radically their perceptions of the world; these facts should instill in all people a sense of humility and fallibilism even in cultural affairs;

5. States have an obligation to work diligently, in concert with other states, toward the establishment of justice and the lessening of cruelty for all people, regardless of where they live;

6. States must commit themselves to establishing and deepening democratic practices, and commit their fortunes to the establishment of social and economic justice for all citizens, and the creation of social and economic justice for peoples who are citizens of other states to the fullest extent feasible given their resources; and
7. States should educate their citizens to understand the ideas and responsibilities expressed in 1-6 above, and not be obstacles to their citizens’ efforts to establish global social and economic justice as well as social and economic justice within the states to which they belong.

In my view, we need not talk about the “priority of loyalties,” or “accidents” of birth, or literal “world citizenship,” or “universalism,” or “contextualism” to assent to these elements or principles of what I think is a tenable cultural, moral and political cosmopolitanism. Much of the discussion for and against cosmopolitanism has gotten bogged-down with such conceptions. It has gotten bogged-down with whether cosmopolitanism is a thick and hearty political project or a “thin gruel.” It has gotten bogged down with whether cosmopolites are a danger to their own political communities. Perhaps it is best to understand the cosmopolite as one who assents to the views sketched in 1-7, above, and cosmopolitanism as the commitment to advancing such assent among our fellows. It might also be a good idea to, when referencing the Stoics, to quickly note that cosmopolitanism does not end with their vague social hopes, but requires sophisticated elaboration and critical insights into economic and political realities and possibilities, and a far better elaborated philosophical basis than what they provide in their aphorisms.

§ IV. Cosmopolitan Morality: Cosmopolitanism as a Virtue Ethics

So much for the political feasibility of cosmopolitanism. We see that there can be tenable “world citizenship” – so to speak. Yet major impediments to a far flung cosmopolitan sensibility remain. This has to do not with getting our ideas, politics and metaphysics straight but with our practices and habits of mind as human beings that tend toward privileging our own communities even at inappropriate times, such in the case, for example, of jingoism (“my country, right or wrong”). To see clear to a widening democratic humanism we must address impulses within us that tend to pull us away from greater confraternity (Richard Rorty’s expanding circles of loyalty) and toward a degenerate tribalism. The management of this degenerate tribalistic impulse requires a consideration of the nature of our relationships as well as a certain kind of moral training and discipline, both “personal” and public. This tribalistic impulse is the principal danger to backsliding away from interexistence and into undemocratic compacts and jingoism. Given this, a missing link in cosmopolitan thought is how we
train ourselves as citizens of democratic states to avoid such backsliding, which usually becomes most visible as simple intolerance, a word that will be employed herein but which captures badly everything from mild chauvinism to genocide.

The specific instances of intolerance with which we most frequently come into contact have been recounted ad nauseam – racism, classism, sexism, and an assortment of other bigotries – and often flow from certain attitudes toward and beliefs about our political, cultural, religious and other metaphysical commitments, commitments which become fetishes rather than revisable imperatives. It is the mode of and the manner in which we invest in these commitments, though not necessarily the commitments themselves, that lead precisely to the aforementioned types of intolerance. I am certainly not the first to draw this conclusion. Yet, if I am right about this, if we are going to make any significant moral progress (beyond that we already have) in addressing intolerance it will be necessary for us (meaning mail handlers, bank tellers and cab drivers, as well as philosophers) to come to terms with the nature of our most cherished beliefs, to see them for what they are and, at the same time, to rethink the kinds of people we need to become at the very core of our characters if we and our children are going to comprise a future polity free from the problems that have plagued human kind as far back as there has been history.

Many communitarians believe that such a re-evaluation and re-valuation of those commitments necessarily leads to the loosening of loyalties and a flavorless and colorless existence. Others think that only those with certain temperaments and psychologies can stand the stresses that would accompany the existential disorientation that would be triggered by such a deeply personal introspective process (after all, a change in psychology is ultimately a personal affair). I do not agree with either of these assessments. Rather, I believe the key to guiding us through the processes is the right kind of moral training and education, i.e. the kind of moral training and education whose specific end is the elimination of untenable forms of intolerance. Further, I think, as did Locke, Royce, Dewey and as do Richard Rorty and others today, that the result will not be a monochromatic social order, but widened circles of loyalty, enhanced possibilities for friendship and mutual trust, the expansion and invigoration of social intercourse, and the stigmatization of bilious ideological and religious rhetoric and ideas.
Now, in what has already been said, the venue for the application of what will follow has been narrowed to what I have referred to as "our kind of civilization," a phrase that can raise hackles. By "our kind of civilization" is meant our democratic-liberal state, even with all of its shortcomings. The venue is narrowed for two reasons. The first reason is that democratic-liberal states, such as the United States, contain and rest upon certain philosophical principles and have a certain moral imagination that I think are the natural springboards from which to achieve what I have just described, a destination that presuppose that we continue what Daniele Archibugi describes as democracy’s “unfinished journey.” The second reason, closely related to the first, has to do with my own conclusions about democratic-liberal states such as ours. This, I think, requires me to say a little something about those conclusions before I discuss the moral problems to which I have already alluded.

I am aware of the debates about liberalism’s shortcomings and I am under little illusion but that they will continue to rage on for a little while longer. Nevertheless, it is yet possible to hold the view that a democratic-liberal state is the best that the species has been able to achieve by way of the governance of heterogenous peoples and the management of pluralism away from incendiary and toward conciliatory states of affairs. Given that belief, a belief held not because of unreflective sentiment but because the arguments of those who have concluded that democratic-liberalism (or procedural liberalism) has something greatly to be desired in terms of its ability to foster a viable sense of community are unconvincing. Democratic liberalism is perhaps the major achievement of political philosophical reflection and realpolitik, and probably more the latter than the former.

It is necessary for me to be clear about this because what is about to be suggested as a partial response to the referenced problems of intolerance bids us to query ourselves about our moral behavior and character by constant reference to the positive aims of our kind of civilization. Further, for those who have held that liberalism has lacked the tools to foster a sense of community, what will be argued not only suggests that it has those tools, but a constitutive and comprehensive ethos as well. For this ethos, we best begin by asking not self-referential moral questions such as “How may I be good?” but rather non-self-referential and political ones: “What kinds of persons ought we to be to further the goals of our liberal-democratic-state?” “What kinds of persons are required to forge the kind of civilization we seem to want to forge for ourselves and for our
posterity?” In saying that I think we need more of them I do not have my eye on the question of the good life or a life well lived for individuals, nor for that matter on how to engage in noble acts toward “the regime,” but rather on how to advance a certain kind of society – one that has set for itself some very difficult moral and political goals.

From my perspective, greater strides toward those goals need not necessarily entail an overhaul of American or Western political and cultural institutions, but rather the cultivation and nurturing of a type of discourse such as has been, in a manner of speaking, exiled from democratic life except in the most desiderative formulations—a type of discourse that, instead, requires us to overhaul our selves as part of a political project. This proffered overhaul is as much psychological as it is ethical, as has already been suggested. I say that such a general ethical discourse has been exiled. Moving as we have been away from the theological preoccupations of pre-modernity, at least arguably, we have at the same time relegated moral training and discourse to the remaining vestiges of religious institutions while we pursued, and pursued with unprecedented ardor and ferocity, instrumental and commercial concerns. Further, we have largely understood such training with reference to the theological world-views of such institutions. Morality-talk, then, has been tethered, perceptually, to theological visions and theological hopes. The idea of vigorous morality-talk outside of the hermeneutic circle of religious tradition and dogma or out from behind the university wall—or without some traceable tether to one or the other—is taken seriously, I would argue, by almost no one. There simply are too few common public “spaces” for it.

The result is that moral discourse has not been taken seriously as a vital component of a functionally secular democratic-liberal state unless what has been deemed to be a moral crisis required rhetorical and argumentative moral redress in the public squares as part of a process of resolving critical policy issues. At those times, times when emotions are engaged and feelings are high, the moral rhetoric is also high and constant. There tends to be a trickle down effect (and sometimes trickle up), with the result being that moral issues get discussed on supermarket check-out lines and in locker rooms and beauty salons. The push for universal suffrage and abolition, and the anti-war rallies of the 1960s and ‘70s are a few examples. However, it has been difficult to see the ubiquitous problem of “intolerance,” a problem that cannot be solved by means of policy prescriptions, as being able to foster the same kind of sustained and public moral discourse. Yet, a sustained and public moral
discourse about the roots of intolerance is precisely what we will need, since without it the changing of hearts and minds (i.e., the changing of psychologies) will be virtually impossible.

It has been a hallmark of modernity that it has taken instrumental pursuits, largely because of its preoccupation with the material progress of the species, far more seriously than it has taken the moral questions that still face the species, questions that have been dismissed as mere obstacles and nuisances springing out of backward-looking (that is not to say backward) traditions or misplaced sentiments. Further, the positivisms of late modernity even attempted to relegate such questions to the level of nonsense. Modernity, being largely forward looking, has had, in practice, little use for imperatives that derive from theology or tradition, i.e. it has created an intellectual climate wherein such imperatives would require more vigorous non-theological and non-traditional (that is, pragmatic or scientific) justifications before being accepted. The imposition of new tests and decision procedures regarding how we live our lives has actually served to loosen the grip of such imperatives and to provide the citizens of modern states with as much freedom as possible without, prudently and recklessly, tearing out the vestigial and tradition-based moral skeleton that has been left to bind together the cultures affected – at least before a new moral skeleton could be suggested. Through the persons of Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Bentham, Mill and a host of other thinkers, we have been in search of that new moral skeleton.

Retrofitting the Virtues

However, while I not only reject a good deal of the content of what has issued forth from the ethical theorists referenced, I am not sure that the proper redress to the moral problems I listed at the outset even requires a new ethical “theory.” As a pragmatist I don’t think that there is much point in putting a lot of hope in theories that never seem to touch the ground, but I do not mind rethinking old ideas. One such old idea is that of virtue. In fact, I call, along with others who would not call themselves pragmatists, for a reconsideration of the place of personal virtue in social and political life. But by virtue, I mean to retrofit an old idea for modern times and modern problems.
In some ways my notion of virtue will not differ greatly from that of Aristotle. In other ways, it will. For example, I do not hold that virtues are ends in themselves. But rather it is the pragmatic dimensions of *areté* that I most of all want to pull out of Aristotle, but in this respect principally—that the goal of *perfecting* democratic-liberal practices, the practices of *our* regime, requires the perfection of ourselves, i.e. the creating of excellent democratic proclivities, impulses, practices, psychologies. As is well known, *areté* as carries the meaning of excellence, i.e. excellence toward some instrumental pursuit, some function. In the context of the *polis* it had a meaning roughly equivalent to civic virtue. The upshot of my notion of virtue is indeed Aristotelian, rather than some sort of loose Victorian notion or sentimental prudishness. The goal is the cultivation of habits of mind and heart that help us perform our liberal-democratic obligations *well*.

Virtues then are purely *pragmatic* devices. We don’t cultivate them because the gods tell us to or in slavish loyalty to dying or dead traditions or sentiments; we don’t cultivate them because they are ends in themselves, but because we need them if we want to flourish, and flourishing is only meaningful if we know what are the measures of success and failure, and that can only be established within the context of a community of mutually assenting and equal members where there is a *telos* to which the members commonly assent.

*In Defense of the Virtues*

My responses to the questions above, i.e. “What kinds of persons ought we to be to further the goals of our liberal-democratic-state?” and “What kinds of persons are required to forge the kind of civilization we seem to want to forge for ourselves and for our posterity?” are grounded in virtue theory (or what I would generally prefer to call virtue ethics). These questions are formulated somewhat differently than Alasdair MacIntyre might formulate them, since the concern here is not so much with the virtues as they arise from within and concern a narrative community, but those virtues that address an *ideal* of a certain narrative community. This does not deny the value of the narrative community that gives rise to certain virtues, but is rather concerned with the virtues needed to go beyond such community, or to perfect rather than to merely maintain it.46 The importance of this distinction is significant, since the perfection of one’s community in accordance with an ideal

---

vision may in fact require virtues heretofore uncatalogued by any philosopher because the *telos*, the ideal, may be substantially different than any heretofore conceived.

Much of what I have discussed in the first three sections dealt with *imagination* and *sensibilities* – cultural, moral and political. The root meaning of imagination, from the Latin *imago*, is the formation of an image, in this case to *see* a state of affairs that may or may not be extant or at hand. The cosmopolitan’s non-sentimentalist call for the use of the imagination is no less tenable than was the call to imagine a political community based upon an end of slavery or upon universal suffrage. Imagination is concerned with the inner life, the psychology of the moral actor, her habits of mind. Virtue ethics holds that our inner lives (i.e., our psychological dispositions and character) *matter* and should be taken into account when discussing moral conduct, and it tends to deflate metaphysics-grounded theories that are exclusively concerned with the rightness or wrongness of external acts and/or consequences of acts, which, for example, deontological and teleological (utilitarian) schools emphasize. Contemporary virtue ethics, such as that of Alasdair MacIntyre, re-conceive ethics by shifting it away from the idea of a "moral ought" that is calculated according to an algorithm that is supposed to have applicability (viz. moral hegemony in settling morally problematic situations) at all times and places.

A major problem (or so it is thought) with virtue ethics is that its concern with *hexis* or character does not permit the adequate treatment of specific moral problems.\(^\text{47}\) To some degree, this criticism is apt. Philosophers

---

\(^{47}\) The Greek word *hexis*, as used by Aristotle, refers to the result of habituation in the practice of the virtues, i.e. *hexis* pertains to the *character* developed in the moral agent due to the repeated *practice* of virtuous *deliberation* and of the performance of virtuous acts. The notion of character derives from the etymology of the Greek verb *echein*, which means "to hold in possession." While *hexis* bespeaks a person man of character, it does not imply any particular sort of character. Aristotle’s assumption is that everyone in fact has a character, just as every rose has petals. But not all characters are good ones, let alone among the “best” ones. Each person has typical patterns of thought and conduct. Some characters are good in view of virtue, others bad. The overall thrust of Aristotle’s ethics is to develop the character in accord with proper moral principles. In this sense, the man of *hexis*, for Aristotle’s purposes, is the man who habituates himself as to virtuous practices. Thus, a good character, one habituated in the ways of virtue, and for that matter *prohairesis*, is also a necessary but not sufficient condition for *eudaimonia* and *eupraxis*, for happiness and good practices. In terms of the development of the good “man” or the “man” of virtue, *hexis* is a key consideration because it is character, that is habits of mind and conduct, that will play the pivotal role in deliberation, particularly excellence in deliberation, or *euboulia*. Thus, in Aristotle’s view, a virtuous character will make it easier to fulfill one’s ethical duties, both to the self as rational animal and to the *polis*, where one is charged with safeguarding the welfare of the entire community and not merely one’s own welfare.
who hold this view do not necessarily believe that a concern with virtue is unimportant, however the virtues may be variously catalogued (Aristotelian, Pauline, Thomistic etc.), and they assert that deontological and teleological approaches are also concerned with questions of character and are much better with specific ethical problems.

But virtue ethicists rejoin that neither deontological nor teleological approaches give enough attention to questions of character and that the universality of the application of rules and formulas prescribe, quite often, extremely problematic formulas for action. The Aristotelean notion of *phronesis* or practical wisdom should be, the virtue ethicist argues, an important component in any decision procedure. *Phronesis* makes sense in adjudicating morally problematic situations just in case contexts and situations are to be taken seriously. I hold that they must be taken seriously.

It is important for a virtue ethicist to further respond to the claim that virtue ethics is not useful in specific morally problematic situations. Some philosophers note a distinction between (a) a virtue ethics that is based *solely* upon an appeal to one’s own internal states, doing away with “right” and “wrong” evaluations of a state of affairs or future act, and (b) a virtue ethics that prefers to keep character considerations in focus when dealing with morally problematic situations while also employing insights from other ethical schools. This later, modified approach to virtue ethics seeks to evaluate such state of affairs or future act by first identifying the necessary virtues and then making an evaluation of whether the state of affairs or act properly reflect the virtues that the virtue ethicist would insist be part of the moral evaluation of such state of affairs or act. Again, the concern of the virtue ethicist is not exclusively with external coercion but with the internal regulation of conduct. In any community or society, no one would assume that its members are moral persons because they choose not to kill or otherwise harm other members *simply* out of obedience to some sort of external judgement regarding their conduct and the fear of reprisal that might attend such behavior, even if the coercion is internalized as “the moral law within.” Rather, persons are held to be moral by other members of their community principally because they exhibit characters that display the use of practical wisdom *and* a concern with principle or duty as may be externally imposed, i.e. they have internalized the *rationale* for moral behavior
and would act morally with reference to the context of the communities and their own needs with or without such external coercion. (The virtuous person, for Aristotle, does not find the exercise of virtue an unpleasant ordeal, but takes pleasure in virtuous conduct.) The distinction between character and duty consists in, inter alia, the following of an “ought” on the one hand versus the bringing to bear one’s entire experience, including knowledge of context, in assessing what is appropriate conduct under the circumstances. Note that a virtue ethics approach need not forego “ought” considerations, but the “ought” will be held as a general rule that will be weighed against other contextual factors.

Modern virtue ethics provides a real-world exit from the unending arguments regarding the rights and obligations of competing parties and toward the character of the agents involved in the decisions. It takes a less puerile view of the role of motivations in maintaining an orderly and harmonious society, which are what, in the end, both deontologists and utilitarians also claim to want. It recognizes, as do most non-ethicists walking the planet, that individuals who perform their duties according to algorithms or who exercise their rights may be people of poor character, harmful to the maintenance of human relations and the goals of society.

The move from an emphasis on acts to an emphasis on actors is employed not only in considerations of atomistic ethics, i.e. the consideration of the acts of individuals, but also – and this is critical for a mature cosmopolitanism – in considering issues of intolerance and social justice. This is precisely the application of virtue ethics I believe is worth considering, and it has two components that reference each other: (1) the macro-societal vs. atomistic-actor level of morality, i.e. that policies, institutional arrangements, and societies themselves should be evaluated and critiqued by asking what kinds of citizens they give rise to; and (2) the kinds of people needed to produce the society we wish to come into being. It is important to determine, in relation to the last point, not only whether the moral characters of citizen-actors can be traced to the social and political environments in which they live, but also whether the social and political environments in which they live can be traced to their characters.

It bears reiterating, in view of criticisms that virtue ethics is of no use in resolving specific morally problematic situations, that the move to a consideration of actors rather than rules and duties are not to be construed as displacing other approaches to adjudicating morally problematic situations, and virtue ethics need not involve
such attempts. So it can be argued that those who raise the so-called “application problem” leave virtue ethics (in the modified form discussed above) standing as one feature of any ethical analysis. Further, virtue ethicists may likewise respond that Kantians and Millians have their own rather notorious problems when it comes to adjudicating specific morally problematic situations.

It is not necessarily the case that the virtues offer no positive guides for action. For example, the notion of temperance may lead to a consideration of equity in the settling of legal or even community disputes (equity is a long-established legal principle). That virtue ethics cannot give an account of what equity is going to look like in specific situations in no way discredits it, since neither can a deontologist or a utilitarian. That is to say, there will often be adjudications or decisions that will lead to quite controversial and practically unacceptable conclusions as far as specific communities are concerned. The point here is to not to point out the flaws of the various theories, but to show that principles of action can be derived from considerations of virtue as well as from other philosophical formulations rooted in assumptions about human nature or theories that rationalize ethical decision procedures to the exclusion of considerations of the emotions and motivations of actors.

It is not the case that a consideration of virtues and vices are mute as regards actions, either for individual actors or communities of actors. A problem does remain, however, in assessing the proper degree or mode of acting with temperance or justice or beneficence, etc. But the utility of the virtues themselves is not harmed by such criticisms, or so it seems to me. It only means that a consensus must be achieved by employing a consideration of the virtues along with teleological or deontological principles that seem salient and tenable. Doing so is the concern of *phronesis*. None of teleology, deontology, contractarianism or other approaches are wholly relevant or wholly irrelevant in the adjudication of morally problematic situations. In my view, the theories war in ethics is misguided and ill-conceived. No one can do justice to questions of morality without taking seriously rules (‘you may not take property that is not yours’), duty to principles (‘you must not treat others as mere means to some end’), or a character that culminates in *prohairesis* (practical and virtuous deliberation) before action. For the collective – communities or states, for example – virtue is what primes the pump of harmonious and even civilized interexistence. The person of virtue is imbued with salutary habits of mind that coercion and “duty” alone do not produce.
Since a modified virtue ethics takes seriously the inner psychological states of moral actors it is needed to complete any true-to-life analysis of a morally problematic situation. Context and circumstances remain critical, and this is very much in line with Aristotle’s not placing ethics in the category of *episteme*. Deontological and teleological theories treat context as largely or wholly irrelevant. It is true that taking context as important does not provide virtue ethics alone with the ability to provide specific remedies to situations, but it does allow for the greater culture and other more particular exigencies to play the roles that deontologists and utilitarians do not want them to play, which is why the latter theories are so problematic in application, regardless of the iteration or revision.

As a pragmatist I am leery of highly formalistic philosophical or moral theories. This leads to a performative contradiction only if one views pragmatism as such a theory, as I do not. In any event, my suspicion of such theories seems consistent with a revised form of Aristotelean virtue ethics. I join virtue ethicists in their skepticism regarding the traditional tone and emphasis of moral theories themselves, which is based upon the observation that moral theories are often grounded in foundationalist metaphysics (Aristotle’s virtue ethics needs revision, in my view, because it is in part also based upon such metaphysics). One may dispense with such foundationalist theorizing and take virtue ethics as an approach to ethics that is nominalistic and that is concerned with a set of questions regarding the types of people we ought to be to achieve certain aims for ourselves and for our communities. At the same time, one may naturalize and re-conceive ‘principles’ and ‘rules’ and exigencies of conduct derived from the experiences we have collectively had in forming communities. Some ‘principles’ and ‘rules’ seem less malleable or revisable than others, but that does not mean that they are off of the continuum that spans the distance from trivial preferences to commitments that generally seem to serve quite urgent human needs and that we have had no good reasons to brush aside. On this continuum, the former are things like the hours in a work day or styles of dress, the latter are things like taking other human lives or torture. Deontologists in particular want to take the latter off of this continuum and place them above it by invoking formalistic metaphysical arguments. Their uneasiness is understandable, but their efforts only create more moral puzzles than they solve.

Such puzzles are not created where one gives up the search for apodictic moral rules, as pragmatist like Dewey and Rorty have argued that we should, and rather takes the virtues seriously. In doing so, one need but view
the virtues as moral chisels, internal to the individual, that are used for the sculpting of conduct and attitudes, even if they do not adequately inform all of our choices as moral agents. As far as the cosmopolitan is concerned, we need virtues that speak to the specifics of context and that go beyond the Aristotelian or Thomistic catalogue.

Virtue and Liberalism

One would be naive to believe that future generations of Americans or any other people can be changed by a dry discourse on virtue. That requires not only discourse, but shared social sentiments and shared social hopes. The sentiments and hopes that may yet entice us to cultivate such virtues are not warm and fuzzy feelings about being virtuous, but the appeal of our vision of the benefits that will derive from living in a society of friends, that is to say a society of political and social equals who exchange encouragement and mutually and cheerfully provide for both physical security and psychological health. The sentiment that may yet entice us is our reflection upon our social hopes. And the reason that we ought not despair that such sentiments are velleities is the progress we have already made.

The United States has been referred to as a political democracy. It is not only a political democracy. We have also created a liberal order, both political and social, one which has been described as placing the right ahead of the good, a fact lamented by some. I roughly translate this description of “the right ahead of the good,” particularly as it issues from the lamenters, as alternatively, the form over of the substance. Lately, the priority of the form over the substance has been assailed as a precarious political posture, leading toward a voluntarist absorption with personal rights versus community-based and community promulgated imperatives, and even as nonsense analytically speaking. The result has been a reconsideration of whether a re-vorlization of various comprehensive conceptions of the good (e.g., our comprehensive communal identities) spoken with confidence in the public squares might provide the best resources for a reformulation of civic or republican virtue hitherto, it is argued, eroded by the move toward voluntarism. A retreat to one’s own lifeworld has been sanctioned, then, not only as a response to specious universalism but as the basis for an American public philosophy that we sorely need, one which is supposed to form the bases for tolerance itself, as well as for public decency and a commitment to national ideals. Modern liberalism has been painted then as a political philosophy that is really
a political and moral cipher, tethered to an effete universalism that sanctions chimerical notions of ourselves as “unencumbered” and which cannot possibly provide the impetus for community building, a notion which has been critiqued by various schools of thought in both cultural and social anthropology as well as in various philosophical schools–by people like Lévi-Strauss, Michael Sandel, Hans-Georg Gadamer, MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. We have, in a manner of speaking, given our gritty substantive differences (or sameness, depending upon whether you are standing inside or outside of the tribe) a kind of higher ontological, psychological and more “authentic” status than those slippery, formal, featureless “things” that we hold in common, but which provide no friction to get our arms around and hold on to. It has become fashionable to pit gritty difference against slippery universalism and to think that we are talking about some crucial difference of political perspective when we do.

Such a notion as the priority of the right over the good saddles us with a false choice between the two. It makes us ask questions like “Where was the self before it got filled up with Catholicism, Jazz and French cuisine?” rather than understanding the self in terms of something like an animal with the capacity to choose between French and Brazilian cuisine and between Catholicism, Methodism and no-ism. It also implies that the choice we have made to pursue a more voluntarist track has led us to forge commitments that have been completely uninformed by our, for example, Catholicism, or that the voluntarist liberal track is devoid of moral content. Perhaps it is time that we step out of this debate by considering the possibility that it is not necessary to choose between the two, and probably never has been; that we have been lost in another one of those philosophical clouds where arguments get severed from their referents. Liberalism, by virtue of its own history, is substantive and constitutive, although it can be described to sound merely procedural, formal and voluntaristic if we are so inclined to describe it that way. Certainly, communitarian proffers can also be described in unflattering ways.

Liberalism being something closer to a moral device than a creed, was never intended to serve as a religion or to stir-up a lot of emotional or nationalist “lather.” When it is pit against our religious or other specific cultural practices, practices that make us feel good emotionally, it seems to come up short, seems to lack content, seems to say little to our deeper yearnings or provide satisfying answers to our deep existential questions (this is in part Michael Sandel’s criticism of liberalism, i.e. that it is more easily conceived in terms of Gesellschaft rather
than Gemeinschaft). But this is not because it has not worked, but precisely because it has. Liberalism didn’t and doesn’t provide an answer to the problem of evil, or the question of whether we have souls that go to heaven, or whether we should be monogamists or polygamists or raise our children to be vegans. What liberalism has done is created the moral and epistemic space, whether or not we have always chosen to use it, to begin to rethink the various answers to very personal issues and communal conclusion. In that sense, liberalism has been a sort of incubator wherein we have begun to learn the practice of tolerance and to endure the discomforts of the reassessment of our final vocabularies or ultimate concerns as well as those of others. What we generally conclude is that there are few unassailable epistemological foundations for most of our cherished cultural practices and beliefs. In fact liberalism provides some sanction for others to be a little rude, that is to say critical, of those practices and beliefs. This, of course, is not likely to make political ideologues and religious conservatives too happy.

But if liberalism is an incubator of sorts, then to what will it give birth? If we are its children, then what might our moral maturity look like? Some say liberalism has shown us the way to relativism. The relativism charge is spurious and liberalism has led instead to a moral weaning whereby we may yet cultivate a citizenry mature enough to slough-off the charges of relativism and moral decay, and who see the real moral problems of American life not in how we define the family or express our sexuality, but in uncovering and addressing cruelties such as racism and classism and in making the pursuit of our personal projects, our own pursuits of happiness, as effortless as possible. These outcomes will not come about merely by the institutional organs of the liberal state, but by the members of the polity seeking such outcomes for themselves and for one another in their quotidian lives, far away from capitols, legislatures and courts.

Talk with enough communitarians and you are likely to come away with the view that at least many believe that the only practices which may be deemed satisfyingly “constitutive” or “comprehensive” are those grounded in particular religious or nationalistic or ethnic traditions, or even particular racial ones. To be Hopi, to be a Jamaican, or a “Trini” or a Jew are generally what is meant by “constitutive.” But liberalism and history have taught us that there are other wells of meaning from which to drink, and that our circles of loyalty and our communities of hope can just as easily be vast as small; that loyalty is not a zero sum game. Liberalism, as a moral device, has given us practice at stepping back from being merely Hopi or a Jamaican to take serious
stock of the fact not only that these identities are not fully definitive of us, but that there are alternative identities to seriously consider.

The moral problem before us isn’t whether we are distinct from some Other or the same at some level, but to what uses our conceptions of our difference and sameness are to be put. A Hopi is clearly the same as a Jamaican or Icelander on many morally relevant levels (he or she is an autonomous self worthy of my respect), and also different on many levels that, too, have moral significance because they attach to the dignity of autonomous persons who have the right to chose the fashion in which they will live out their lives (he or she has particular answers to life’s conundrums based upon lived experiences and internal discourses which comprise a narrative tradition(s)). Liberalism as both a substantive and regulative cultural product bids us to regulate when our other commitments become dangerous for the civilization or body politic as a whole. It functions like a gland functions; being both a part of the body and regulating its other parts. Only when we become too abstract in our thinking do we see the impossibility of a thing being able to regulate and yet be a part of the same system, do we see the impossibility of liberalism being anything but formal.

The Post-Liberal Society, Cosmopolitanism and Cosmopolitan Virtue

Yet, liberalism largely works through coercion, not what Aristotle called prohairesis, i.e. moral deliberation with a view to proper moral action. It largely works by the threat of sanction against those whose other commitments threaten the stability of the system. Title VII, the ADA, the establishment of religion clause of the Constitution, and laws requiring special penalties for crimes of bias are coercive mechanisms of the liberal state. In that sense, liberalism is not yet the political philosophy of morally mature persons nor, in Kant’s sense of the word, does it represent enlightenment. If coercion has been the method the liberal state has employed to train us to engage in mutual respect, what will be the method of training ourselves for participation in a post-liberal society? What is a post-liberal society?

American civilization (and others like it) has arrived at an important juncture. Down one road stands a wall which marks the limit of our political or social progress, a kind of “end of history” conclusion about how far freedom and tolerance can go. Down the other, a big question mark that hides the effect of the relaxation of our
imperatives and value fetishes and a continual advance toward what King liked to call the beloved community. This second road is the one I think we must try. It will be an extraordinarily hard road, on which there will be many failures. It will demand much of us and of future generations of our children. It consists in our coming to terms with the fluid and transitory natures of most of our political, religious and social exigencies, and our learning to cope with change and uncertainty as not a loss but as an inevitability of human existence. It will require that we be willing to accept the fallibility of our conclusions, *while we enjoy and celebrate the benefits of our way of seeing things and of doing things*, our ethnophilia rather than our ethnocentrism. It will require that we give up the notion that one’s so-called race or so-called sexual preferences, or manners of worship are worth killing for and dying over, or less severely, worth dividing ourselves arbitrarily into camps of people who do “X” or look “X,” and camps of people who don’t. At the same time, it will require that we accept what has heretofore been unacceptable, i.e. that we can have meaningful and enjoyable lives while moderating the sometimes fanatical emotional stake we have in our final vocabularies and our ultimate concerns. It will require that all our sacred ideas and sacred ways be put on the table—opened-up to the possibility of critique by outsiders—while the meaning of “sacred” gets rethought and naturalized to mean something closer to sublime than to divine.

What kinds of sensibilities and characters will we need if we choose this second road? What kind of virtues? Bracketing for the moment the issue of the likelihood of a civilization comprised of such persons (King did not think the Beloved Community a literal possibility), what would the world look like if such a civilization could be forged out of the kind of imagination liberalism has granted us? I think this kind of civilization possible but will take place (i) on terms that, perhaps, King would not have accepted, and (ii) to use the title of a recent book, “one by one, from the inside out.”

What I have presupposed is that the difficulties that attend the second road are entailed, largely if not completely, in the lack of certain habits of mind and character of soul that may only be cultivated through the training of men and women (and most importantly, children) for fit service to a way of life that we claim we wish to realize. In a nutshell, I have presupposed that the obstacles to such fitness are reducible, in part, to problems of human character and thus of human psychology. If we can still hold, as we have since Aristotle, that the opposite of virtue is vice, one would expect that there be a recognition also that there are vices peculiar
to modern democratic and liberal societies as well as that there is a need for new virtues to counter them, or at least virtues heretofore unrecognized as such or, more accurately, heretofore not understood as such. These vices, which have also heretofore gone unnamed, consist in a very unhelpful and, to borrow a word from philosopher Jason Hill, “immature” posture we take toward (i) our various projects as autonomous individuals and (ii) our membership in communities of like-minded or like-looking persons, be they nation-states, political parties, less grand affinity groups or so-called races. This unhelpful and immature posture consists in a certain cultural lethargy and inertia that interfere with a desire to “hear” and “see” other ways to approach the world, and/or arrogance in the face of those who have different projects and memberships. (I coin these vices existential narcissism and axiological inertia, respectively. The attendant virtues are those discussed as the principles of cosmopolitanism, i.e. - interexistence, humility, and contingency.)

The second road, then, requires of us some courage. Putting away these vices is an activity that tends to be, for reasons that can be considered aboriginal, uncomfortable and even, at times, frightening. It requires a certain cutting of the bonds of our context and our situatedness in order to make room for the possibility of fresh insight, the fresh perspective which may come given the right circumstances and with the passage of enough time. It requires that we become a kind of sojourner even where we stand, willing to share our views and our stories and willing to hear the Other’s, even those we think have sensibilities far different than our own. It requires passage through the fear of the outcome of an exchange of cultural body fluids, that is, fear of changing into something that we have never envisioned ourselves as possibly being. It is precisely for this reason that our moral discourse must find or embrace creative ways to shape a civic sensibility the aim of which is to make such sharing an obligation and habit of citizens of advanced or advancing liberal-democracies, and to develop psychologies that will allow such reconsiderations to be undertaken with far less aboriginal/psychological discomfort, existential disorientation and primal fear.

Conclusion

THE FUTURE OF COSMOPOLITANISM depends upon it being taken seriously as a morality, a cultural regulator and a politics, and it will require a significant retraining of human psychology for a far greater
tolerance for change and cultural difference, even while we work hard to preserve the *eros* of community that quickens our human existence and provides a sense of stability and comfort. This might mean that the goals of cosmopolitanism are not likely to be achieved. But it seems that, given our shrinking planet, given the ability of aggressors like terrorists to do a tremendous amount of harm to others, given our dwindling natural resources, given the possibilities of pandemics and the pollution of our environment, cosmopolitanism is not an option, it is, whether as presented here or in a more tenable iteration, a necessary prescription for the avoidance of recurrent human catastrophes.

**The Cosmopolitan Catalogue**

Primary Virtues and Their Corresponding Vices
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Virtues</strong></th>
<th><strong>Vices</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy</td>
<td>Indifference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humility</td>
<td>Existential (and Cultural) Narcissism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>Cultural Rigidity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interexistence</td>
<td>Axiological Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confraternity</td>
<td>Parochialism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Texts and Journals


1990.


**Internet References**

World Bank data from (January 10, 2002):

[www.worldbank.com](http://www.worldbank.com)

World Trade Organization data (January 10, 2002):

[www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org)